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ABSTRACT 
 
THE IMPACT OF EU CONDITIONALITY IN AFFECTING CANDIDATE 
COUNTRIES' HUMAN RIGHTS REFORM MAKING PROCESS 
TURKISH CASE 
Erdem, Nilay 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Paul Andrew Williams 
 
May 2013 
 
 This study is an attempt to investigate the extent of  EU political 
conditionality tool's impact on triggering human rights reform making in candidate 
countries to the EU. It does so by analyzing the distinctive characters of the political 
conditionality and human rights reform making process. In this framework, the study 
argues that whereas the EU conditionality is an invaluable tool in encouraging the 
candidate states  in terms of reform making, its impact is not independent from 
external factors. 
 
Keywords: EU Political Conditionality, Human Rights Reforms, Candidate 
Countries to the EU 
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ÖZET 
 
ADAY ÜLKELERİN İNSAN HAKLARI REFORM SÜRECİNDE AB ŞARTLILIK 
İLKESİ'NİN ETKİSİ 
TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ 
Erdem, Nilay 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Paul Andrew Williams 
 
Mayıs 2013 
 
 Bu çalışma, Avrupa Politik Şartlılık İlkesi'nin, AB'ye aday ülkelerin insan 
hakları reform sürecini tetiklemedeki etkisinin boyutlarını incelemeyi 
amaçlamaktadır.  Tez bu amacına, politik şartlılık ilkesi ve insan hakları reform 
sürecinin ayırt edici özelliklerini analiz ederek ulaşır. Bu çerçevede, çalışma AB 
Şartlılık İlkesi'nin  aday ülkelerin reform süreçleri üzerindeki etkisinin paha 
biçilemez bir teşvik edici unsur olduğunu kabul etse de, bu etkinin dış unsurlardan 
bağımsız olmadığını savunmaktadır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: AB Politik Şartlılık İlkesi, İnsan Hakları Reformları, AB'ye Aday 
Ülkeler 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Turkey, being one of the most problematic candidate states to the European 
Union (EU), has experienced remarkably huge amount of problems in its relationship 
with the Union, especially with regarding respect for human rights. The reason for 
Turkey’s inability to have adequate respect for human rights can be analyzed 
twofold: internal dimensions and external factors.  
 Because the internal dimensions in Turkey were quite problematic, Turkey 
could not manage to act accordingly when it comes to respect for human rights. 
Especially the military coups paved the way for creating a more undemocratic 
environment. For instance, with the military coup of 1980, the 1961 Constitution left 
its place to the 1982 Constitution which includes more militaristic and nationalistic 
articles compared to the previous one. In such a chaotic and undemocratic 
environment, it would not be a surprise to observe an increase in the human rights 
violations. 
 Following the signing of the Ankara Agreement in 1963, Turkey has been an 
associate member of the Union ( the European Community at that time). It is fair to 
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state that, due to especially the inadequacies mentioned above, besides low economic 
development level, the Union refused the Turkish application for full membership in 
1987. Although the Commission declared the eligibility of Turkey for full 
membership, it emphasized the time required for being fully capable for membership. 
Additionally, the Union, as expected, could not be able to present any motivating 
incentive for Turkey which shows its reluctance for considering Turkish application. 
Therefore, the membership process left its place to a Customs Union agreement 
between the two. The Union and Turkey decided to sign the Customs Union treaty 
that came into effect on 31 December, 1995 (European Commission, 2013). The 
treaty provided Turkey with privileges on trading goods and trading products with 
European Economic Community members.  
 However, in the Luxembourg Summit of 1997, Turkey had a big 
disappointment because the Union did not include Turkey in its candidate states list. 
In other words, although Turkey was expecting to be declared as a candidate state, 
the Union did not declare it as a candidate country. This action of the Union draw 
reaction from the Turkish officials and the public, and, finally, 1999 Helsinki 
Summit had been a turning point in this regard. In the Helsinki Summit, the Union 
declared Turkey as a candidate state which provides a bunch of reforms and 
improvements to take place. Aftermath of this important milestone, the transition 
period started, paving the way for incredible reform making process up until 2005.  
 The EU has always been considered as having a catalyst role in encouraging 
the candidate countries for reform making and it has specific tools for this mission 
one of which is EU conditionality. In this period, following acquiring candidacy 
status, the leading role for triggering the reform process was EU conditionality's. 
However, the efficacy of EU conditionality is an important issue to be elaborated on 
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because the reforms that have been actualized during the period of 1999-2004 most 
probably could not have been realized without the oppressive impact of this 
important enlargement tool of the EU. 
 EU conditionality is an important mechanism used especially while dealing 
with candidate countries aiming for accession to the Union. In other words, it is a 
tool used by international actors, like the EU, with the aim of presenting certain 
incentives in order to obtain compliance of specific conditions by the candidate 
countries. The conditionality tool was first presented in the 1990s as a set of 
conditions for membership to the ten Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs).
1
 It, however, is not a political method particular to the EU. The traditional 
conditionality is widely used by international financial institutions (IFI) such as the 
IMF and the World Bank. The rationale of classical IFI conditionality is quite simple. 
Specific and quantitative targets, i.e. inflation rates or government deficits etc., are 
set for beneficiaries as conditions for receiving financial benefits. So, the targets to 
be achieved are clear and there is a symmetry between expected goals and expected 
benefits to be reaped. EU counterpart of IFI conditionality lacks some of these 
qualities that boost its effectiveness. In contrast to the IFI conditionality, EU 
conditionality is rather vague due to its wording/definition and implication both in 
terms of benefits and tasks to be undertaken (Grabbe, 1999: 4). Characterizing the 
EU conditionality as a myth, therefore, means that it lacks the expected causal 
relationship between the Commission’s use of conditionality and the compliance of 
the candidate countries through policy, or institutional adjustments and normative 
                                                          
1
 The ten CEE applicants for membership are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. An eleventh applicant, Cyprus, began 
negotiations in 1998 at the same time as five of the CEE countries (the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia). 
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change (Hughes et al, 2004: 17). The inconsistency of results and policy paths are the 
expected outcomes of the EU conditionality due to its lack of uniformity. 
 However, the transforming power of EU conditionality is not negligible. 
Especially, the levers , such as gate-keeping, monitoring and financial aiding, makes 
the conditionality tool a lot more stronger for the presenting institution, the EU in 
this regard. Thus, Turkey made an incredible effort in order to comply with the 
Copenhagen Criteria which would provide it with the opening of accession 
negotiations. As a matter of fact, in October 3, 2005 the negotiations has started in 
result of the betterments that Turkey adopted in legislation and implementation. 
Democracy and human rights conditions improved dramatically when its compared 
to the period before the Helsinki Summit. Nevertheless, after the transition period, 
the pace of the reforms has slowed down mostly due to ineffective and inconsistent 
application of EU conditionality.  
 Thereby, the aim of this thesis is to analyze whether EU conditionality played 
a role of catalyst in supporting human rights reforms actualization in Turkey's 
membership journey. In order to achieve this aim, different time zones, namely the 
period after the Helsinki Summit until the negotiation opening (1999-2004) and 
aftermath of the opening negotiations (2005- ), will be focused and analyzed in 
detail.  
 In lights of these, this study asks three major interrelated questions: First, 
does EU conditionality played a role in Turkey's human rights reform making 
process, and if yes how? Secondly, does the efficacy of EU conditionality has 
changed from time to time? Thirdly, what were the reasons behind EU 
conditionality's shifting efficiency? 
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 The thesis mainly argues that there has been an incredible reforming period in 
the years between 1999 and 2004, however, afterwards there has been problems in 
the implementation of these reforms in human rights area. Additionally, Turkey had 
a prominent break time in legislation after the transition period. The main reason 
behind this break time and implementing problems is supported to be the inefficient 
application of the EU conditionality. 
 The organization of the chapters is as follows. After the introduction chapter, 
the second chapter introduces us a detailed literature review on EU conditionality. In 
this chapter, different arguments of various experts, mainly on EU politics and EU 
conditionality, will be offered. Various perspectives on defining the elements for an 
efficient EU conditionality will be presented. The chapter also offers the theoretical 
framework used in this thesis. It does so by emphasizing the impact of EU 
conditionality in triggering candidate states' human rights reform process without 
neglecting the other elements that may have an impact on the success of the process. 
However, the study strengths its stance by a crucial case and some empirical 
examples from the literature. This study also offers a literature review on human 
rights after stating the methodology used in it, the intervening variables, the data 
sources from which the data has gathered, and the preliminary evidence that makes 
the hypothesis an invaluable one. The chapter concludes with an analysis on how the 
relationship between EU conditionality and human rights in candidate countries is. 
 The third chapter offers a wide range empirical analysis of human rights 
records in Turkey by focusing on various problems and their sources. Then, it 
establishes a link between EU conditionality's application and human rights reforms 
actualized in the transition period. This part is the part in which the impact of EU 
conditionality is more observable. The problematic elements of human rights records 
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are defined carefully and the actualized reforms and the remaining problems are 
highlighted. After giving a background information, this chapter only focuses on the 
facts happening in the transition period. 
 The fourth chapter investigates the time zone following the transition period 
by focusing on the existing situation and analyzing the reforms actualized and remain 
untouched for a certain time period. Then, it focuses the possible sources of 
persisting problems and indicates possible causes. While defining the problems it 
does not neglect to suggest adequate attitudes for better outcomes for both sides. 
 Finally, the concluding chapter brings EU conditionality and human rights 
records together in light of the theoretical framework and empirical findings of the 
study. Hence, the thesis concludes with an evaluation of the extent to which EU 
conditionality's impact on altering conditions in candidate states, Turkey in this 
sample, exists and in what conditions this powerful tool of enlargement loses its 
strength.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 EU CONDITIONALITY AS A FRAMEWORK 
 
 
2.1 EU Conditionality  
 
2.1.1 Literature Review on EU Conditionality 
In this section of the second chapter, a literature review on EU conditionality 
will be elaborated with the purpose of demonstrating the complex and vague 
character of EU conditionality from which the impact of its transformative power is 
derived. Although there is a bit ambiguity in the literature about the precise 
definition and conceptualization of EU conditionality, the importance of the exact 
definition for having better impact is nonignorable. From one side, the variety of the 
definition seems as an advantageous feature regarding its supply for broad research 
agenda, however, the other side of the coin should be considered also. The 
multiplicity of its definition and conceptualization causes a lot of problems when it 
comes to the application of EU conditionality (Grabbe, 2002: 250). 
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 In the literature various scholars study EU conditionality and its impact on 
candidate states’ domestic institutional alterations in the key areas of EU’s concerns 
such as democracy and human rights (Linden, 2002, Schimmelfennig, 2005, 
Kubicek, 2003, Kelley, 2004, Vachudova, 2005, Pridham, 2002, Hughes et al, 2004).   
Most of these scholars argue that international mechanisms, in this case EU 
conditionality, have significant impact on countries’ domestic political alterations. In 
this respect EU conditionality, which is stated by the Union in 1993 via Copenhagen 
Criteria, proposes that any candidate country must comply with certain prerequisites 
such as promoting democracy, respecting the rule of law, human and minority rights 
in order to realize full membership. Moreover, the candidate states should have a 
functioning market economy and the ability to undertake the obligations of 
membership (The European Council, 1993). 
Ronald H. Linden (2002: 371) argues that "the conditionality process 
generates enormous pressure on the applicant countries to conform to what the EU 
expects of them in the realm of creating a democratic society and the ability to 
engage in international economic competition." He also advocates that potential EU 
membership is a strong mechanism for the applicant states to make the necessary 
alterations in their domestic institutional systems. Nevertheless, Linden states that 
the impact of international mechanisms, such as the EU conditionality, is bounded by 
certain factors such as the culture and the political structure of the candidate 
countries. Also, the relationship between the state and the society plays a crucial role 
in defining the impact of EU conditionality. Therefore, according to him there may 
be some key intervening variables, such as the political structure or the governing 
party of the candidate state, to specify the impact of EU conditionality on human 
rights reform realization. In accordance with this idea also Frank Schimmelfennig 
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(2002: 3) advocates that for EU conditionality to cause domestic institutional 
alterations, domestic awareness and willingness for change are required. In 
accordance with this argument Judith Kelley (2004) argues that EU conditionality 
may not have an effect on candidate countries’ reform periods unless the country is 
ready for this change. For example, she states that an authoritarian leadership will 
diminish the possibility of EU conditionality serving as a facilitator for reform 
processes. These arguments of Kelley are in line with some other scholars’ 
arguments such as Paul Kubicek and George Pridham. Paul Kubicek (2003a) and 
George Pridham (2002: 185) both argue that it is almost impossible for international 
institutional mechanisms to affect authoritarian regimes. They also argue that EU 
conditionality’s impact depends on institutional constraints such as cultural habits 
and political structures of the candidate countries. Kubicek also asserts that in order 
to have much more effective institutional mechanisms, i.e. EU conditionality, within 
the relatively authoritarian countries, the Union should establish domestic alliances 
to promote its values and norms.  
Anna Milada Vachudova (2001: 3) advocates that “domestic politics 
determine the way ruling elites respond to the incentives of EU membership’’. While 
Vachudova (2001: 3) argues in parallel with Kubicek (2003a), Kelley (2004) and 
Pridham (2002: 185) she also states that the relationship between the candidate 
country and the Union is a determiner for the EU conditionality to have an impact on 
policy alterations on the applicant state. She also posits that the regime type is a 
significant intervening variable between EU conditionality’s impact and realization 
of political reforms in the candidate countries on a similar line with the argument of 
Linden (2002: 371) 
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In an overall assessment, EU conditionality’s impact on reform realizations in 
candidate countries is bounded by those candidate countries’ domestic institutional 
structures. 
On the other hand, Heather Grabbe (2002: 249-68) argues that due to the 
vague definition of EU conditionality stated by the Union, the conditions are too 
broad and open to interpretation, which makes EU conditionality less effective on 
realization of reforms in candidate countries. According to Grabbe, although there is 
a strong relationship between EU conditionality and the willingness of the candidate 
countries to comply with the accession criteria, political concerns of the current 
member states also play a crucial role in the effectiveness of EU conditionality. 
Therefore, she argues that, due to the lack of clarity of the concept of EU 
conditionality and the ambiguous political readiness of the current member states for 
enlargement, EU conditionality cannot be as effective as it would be expected to be 
in changing candidate states’ domestic structures. In this respect one may interpret 
that unlike the previously mentioned scholars who are mostly emphasizing domestic 
readiness and willingness of the candidate states rather than current member states, 
Grabbe argues that current member states’ willingness and readiness is required for 
EU conditionality to have an impact on candidate states’ reform procedures. 
Similarly, Hughes, Sasse and Gordon (2004a: 523-51) argue that although there is an 
obvious causal relationship between the use of EU conditionality and possible 
outcomes, i.e. reforms that can be achieved, there is a problem with the application 
of EU conditionality which makes it less effective in reaching outcomes in specific 
policy areas. They argue that EU conditionality should be taken as a process rather 
than a constant element of causation and its strengths and weaknesses should be 
taken into account on a case by case basis. Therefore, these authors argue that the 
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candidate states’ domestic structure should be a determinant for the way of EU 
applies its conditionality in order to achieve maximum effectiveness in realization of 
reforms in the applicant states. 
In sum, it can be asserted that although these scholars are interested in the 
relationship between EU conditionality application and the political structure of the 
candidate states similar to Linden, Schimmelfennig, Kubicek, Kelley, Pridham and 
Vachudova, they argue that the problematic structure of EU conditionality and 
readiness of current member states rather than the candidate ones matter also in EU 
conditionality’s effectiveness on reform process of candidate states. 
There are also some scholars in the literature who have analysed the EU 
conditionality and its impact on candidate countries’ domestic institutional reforms 
from an empirical point of view. Geoffrey Pridham (2008, 365-87) argues that even 
though there is some defects of EU conditionality such as its imperfect 
implementation, all in all its effectiveness as a tool for reform realization is 
undeniable. He states that EU’s political conditionality plays the role of being a 
catalyst for achieving progress on ethnic minority rights in Slovakia and Latvia. He 
advocates that because EU conditionality was the driving force for reform realization 
in these countries, after the accession, reforms have been realized in a much slower 
pace. Similarly, Uğur and Yankaya (2008: 586) advocate that EU conditionality, by 
decreasing the political costs of controversial reforms, enabled Turkey with a chance 
for making policy reforms. They also argue that AKP (Justice and Development 
Party) government has realized that if Turkey commits itself to EU conditionality, 
the economic costs of reforms would be decreased. Moreover, Schimmelfennig, 
Engert and Knobel (2003: 505) assert that the impact of EU conditionality is not 
something independent from the candidate states’ domestic political costs of 
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compliance. When it is applied to the Turkish case they argue that although the 
impact of EU conditionality is not huge due to the domestic intervening factors, such 
as the undemocratic constitutional matters inherited from 1980 military intervention,  
the reforms that took place would not have been realized in the absence of EU 
conditionality. By emphasizing EU conditionality’s impact these authors advocate 
that other mechanisms such as social influence and transnational mobilization are 
irrelevant for the candidate states’ willingness for making reforms. On the contrary, 
Judith Kelley argues that socialization-based efforts are not useless but they have the 
role of being guidance for actors to realize the required reforms while the motor 
force is still EU conditionality. Although she does not specifically analyse the 
Turkish case she states that "the insights will most readily apply to candidates such 
as Turkey and the Balkan states queuing for EU membership" (Kelley, 2004: 454). 
 
2.1.2 Conceptualizing EU Conditionality in Candidate Countries 
Jeffrey Checkel (2000: 11-27) has various definitions for conditionality. First 
of all, he defines conditionality as "a basic strategy through which international 
institutions promote compliance by national governments." However, he argues that 
the traditional incentivizing character of conditionality has broadened and to be 
supplemented by certain strategies in order to have a strong transformation power on 
candidate countries. When defining conditionality, Checkel often emphasize its 
nature of changing states’ behaviours and policies, hence it is obvious that he sees 
conditionality as a political tool for international institutions usage to convince states 
to behave as they wish them to behave.  
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Another definition he suggests is that "conditionality is a mutual arrangement 
by which a government takes, or promises to take, certain policy actions (Checkel, 
2000: 18). Although at first side these two definitions seem alike, there are slightly 
different than each other. The word ‘mutually’ in the second definition should gather 
some attention on it. With this definition, Checkel seems to emphasize more on the 
two sides in the application of conditionality.  He also argues that conditionality is 
simply a pre-condition that should be negotiated between an international institution 
and a state before the former suggests a carrot, such as granting EU membership in 
EU conditionality case.  
Hans Agné (2009: 1-18) reinterprets Checkel (2000: 11-27) and defines 
conditionality as "the practice of setting conditions for the provision of a good from 
one actor or organization to another." However, he also stresses on the definition of 
conditionality from another perspective which includes more coercion than voluntary 
action by interpreting Adrian Hyde Price (2006: 217-234) and stating that 
"conditionality can be defined as the practice of a stronger actor imposing reforms on 
a weaker." With these two different definitions Agné (2009: 2) argues that 
conditionality stances as a means of both coercion and invitation for voluntary action 
and adaptation. 
In order to conceptualize EU conditionality, I use the definition of both 
Jeffrey Checkel and Hans Agné because I think in my case a comprehensive 
definition is more useful than a limited one. I think Checkel’s definitions are simple, 
basic and comprehensive at the same time. They are simple and basic because they 
are easy to understand and follow. I also think that Agné has stressed on a very 
important aspect of conditionality which is whether it is coercive or voluntary action. 
Therefore, for this thesis EU conditionality is conceptualized as a comprehensive 
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strategy defining certain rules in order to change the behaviours of the candidates, 
either with coercion or via voluntary action, in favor of the applicant institution. 
Hence, EU conditionality will not only be associated with consent of the candidate 
countries but also with the coercion applied on them by the Union.  
For the operationalization I will basically use the Copenhagen Criteria. 
However, because I am trying to find the impact of EU conditionality on candidate 
states’ human rights reforms I will be interested in political criteria rather than 
economic ones. Therefore, I will take the democracy, human rights and the rule of 
law criteria into account in order to find the relationship between my variables. I am 
also planning to look into the acquis communautaire for the purpose of analyze both 
its applicability in candidate countries and its effect for furthering reform processes.  
 
2.2 Human Rights 
 
2.2.1 Literature Review on Human Rights 
Human rights is honestly a huge subject to deal with in a thesis which 
requires a precise conceptualization and operationalization in order to fit in a thesis 
as the dependent variable as in the case of this current one. Even if it is the case, in 
the first place, it is a necessity to analyze it broadly, though. For better understanding 
and producing valuable arguments the subject will be covered in its all senses and 
immediately will be followed by a limited version. For this aim, the broad definitions 
of human rights made by various scholars will be given and the conceptualization of 
the subject will be made according to the existing literature. 
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Jack Donnelly (1989: 9) is basically defining human rights as "the rights one 
has simply because one is a human being – droits de l’homme, Menschenrechte, ‘the 
rights of man’." These rights are moral kind of rights of the highest order and no 
higher rights appeal is available (Donelly, 1989: 12). The most interesting aspect of 
human rights is that the arguments or the struggle for protecting these rights become 
required only if there is a threat or denial to the enjoyment these rights, other than 
that there is no need to argue about human rights because they are given to one just 
because of his/her being a human being, in other words it is that natural that no one 
ought to argue otherwise (Donelly, 1989: 13). If one claims a human right, the only 
reason for that claim could be the hope for eliminating the need to claim it again in 
that society. The centrality of the possession paradox of human rights is very 
interesting in that sense. If these rights are well protected in one society, than there is 
no need to use or mention them simply because the people belonging to that society 
will continue to have these rights naturally. In other words, if a human right is being 
claimed it is because that human right is violated or not being enjoyed even if it 
already belongs to the one who claims it. Therefore, one may argue that human rights 
naturally have the power of altering or challenging "existing institutions, practices, or 
norms, especially legal institutions" just because of their naturally strong existence 
(Donelly, 1989: 14). The extralegal character of human rights makes this intervention 
possible. Although most right-holders would opt for parallel legally enforceable 
rights, according to certain scholars the moral force of human rights will usually be 
greater which enables them to alter certain behaviours of institutions and even 
governments (Rex, 1980: 393). In any case, even the legal and other low rights fail, 
the morally stronger rights, human rights, will always be valuable. From this point of 
view, it is fair to state that "legal rights ground legal claims on the political system to 
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protect already established legal entitlements. [On the other hand,] human rights 
ground moral claims on the political system to strengthen or add to existing legal 
entitlements" (Donelly, 1989: 16). This situation does not make human rights any 
better than legal rights but just makes them different. 
However, controversial is the question of how does being human, i.e. human 
nature, pave the way for having those rights. At that point Christian Bay’s ‘needs 
theory’ of human rights would be helpful for the explanation. Bay argues that human 
needs establish the human rights. As the International Human Rights Covenants
2
 sets 
it, the rights are needed not for life but for a life of dignity; that is to say, the inherent 
dignity of human person gives rise to the right for human rights (Donelly, 1989: 17). 
Due to this nature of human rights, they are not unsteady or changeable. Even though 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
3
 points to little about the life in most 
countries, minimum conditions required for a dignified life, a life any human being 
deserves, are set (Donelly, 1989: 18). 
According to Lynn Hunt (2007: 20), three interlocking qualities are required 
to human rights: the right has to be natural, meaning they are inherent in human 
beings; equal, meaning they should be applicable in the same way for everyone; and 
universal meaning their applicability would not change from one place to another. In 
other words, it is a necessity for rights to be claimed as human rights that "all 
humans everywhere in the world must possess them equally and only because of 
their status as human beings." 
                                                          
2
 International Human Rights Covenants were opened for signature in 1966 and came into force in 
1976. With this Covenants a single treaty envisioned in 1948 evolved into two: the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. The Covenants together with the Universal Declaration, represents an authoritative 
statement of international human rights norms. 
3
 Adopted by United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948. 
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Since these three principles are the core features of human rights, the 
American Declaration of Independence of 1776 and French Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and Citizens of 1789 should be taken as the first documents valuable for 
human rights’ political expression. Although the English Bill of Rights of 1689 is 
estimated as being ‘ancient rights and liberties’, because it did not touch upon these 
three principles it cannot be approached as a valuable human rights document. 
Oppositely, the Declaration of Independence stated that "all men are created equal 
and all of them possess unalienable rights" and the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and Citizen insisted that "men are born and remain free and equal in rights" (Hunt, 
2007: 21). This simply means that somewhere between 1689 and 1776 the rights 
previously seen belonging to certain people, started to be seen as universal natural 
rights and applicable to every single human being equally. 
Hunt (2007: 25) advocates that human rights had almost no explicit definition 
in the second half of the 18
th
 century; however, the English jurist William Blackstone 
defined human rights as "the natural liberty of mankind." Mirabeau and d’Holback, 
the controversial Enlightenment figures, defined the rights of man "as if they were 
obvious and needed no justification or definition, in other words self-evident" (Hunt, 
2007: 25).  
When one thinks how was human rights made an issue related to world 
politics, it can be said that the holocaust that is to say, the planned mass murder of 
millions of innocent people by Hitler during the World War II, allowed human rights 
to take a place for itself in world politics (Donelly, 2007: 3-20). Human rights had 
not even mentioned in the Covenant of League of Nations, the predecessor of the 
United Nations (UN), and it can be argued that they became a subject of international 
relations with the establishment of the UN in 1945. One of the organization’s 
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principal purposes is even “encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all” as stated by the Article 1 of the UN Charter (Donelly, 
2007: 5). The lack of standards and conceptualization of human rights was 
eliminated of by the UN immediately after its establishment. First the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was opened for signature 
on December 9, 1948 and it was followed by the adaptation of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, on December 10, 1948, that is the most widely 
accepted statement of international human rights norms and standards still (Donelly, 
2007: 5). World-wide acceptance of human rights has been fostered by the efforts 
made in these years such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (Davies, 
1988: 20). 
In the Cold War era, after the Iron Curtain came down in Central and Eastern 
Europe and the Communists won a victory in China in 1949, human rights gained a 
lot of importance in world politics and even became an area of superpower struggle. 
For instance, freedom of information, which was largely violated by the Soviets, was 
discussed in great detail by the Commission on Human Rights in the late 1950s 
(Donelly, 2007: 6). 
On the contrary, Peter Davies (1988) argues that the origins of human rights 
belong to early philosophical and legal theories, according to which individuals had 
certain immutable rights just because their being human, of ‘natural law’, which is a 
higher law than the positive laws of the states, and not to the establishment of the UN 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as is largely assumed. 
The term human rights openly and very clearly indicates its nature and 
origins, i.e. its derivation. Human rights are "held by all human beings, irrespective 
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of any rights or duties that individuals may have as citizens, members of families, 
workers, or parts of any public or private organization or association" (Donelly, 
2007: 21). Therefore, it is sure that all human beings should hold the equal rights no 
matter what and since being human cannot be renounced, human rights are naturally 
inalienable. 
Moreover, in the literature some scholars specifically studied human rights 
reforms and the impact of the EU’s efforts to promote them.  Thomas Smith (2003: 
111-31) argues that during the period between 1999 and 2003, the EU put a great 
amount of effort for promoting human rights reforms’ actualization in Turkey via 
both diplomatic pressure and "conditionality", although in the decade prior to 1999 
the pressure on Turkey was very modest. He states that although Turkey has had a lot 
of deficiencies in human rights, after the 1999 Helsinki Summit the reform process 
accelerated because of the candidate status that Turkey had gained. Smith (2003: 
111) states that “ Ankara has initiated ambitious reforms in line with the Copenhagen 
Criteria and the Accession Partnership to strengthen the rule of law, expand basic 
freedoms, and protect minority rights” after the 1999 Helsinki European Council.  
 
2.2.2 Conceptualizing Human Rights 
When it comes to the conceptualization of human rights, the attitude of 
Donnelly is a bit confusing. Although the International Bill of Human Rights, the 
combination of Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Human 
Rights Covenants, brings a widely accepted list of human rights, such as legal, 
personal, political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights, Donnelly (1989: 23-24) 
is simply unable to conceptualize its theory and provide a list of human rights. 
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However, he does not see it as a problem due to his perspective of human rights 
nature. He does not see a necessity to classify these rights because they naturally 
belong to any human being no matter what. However, Donnelly accepts the list of 
human rights derived from the Universal Declaration, in which the widely accepted 
international standards for the list of human rights is stated, 18 years after he claimed 
that there is no necessity for the list. He still states that there is a lack of 
philosophical consensus on the list of human rights but anyway there is the list of 
human rights and it better to accept it in order to be able to act internationally 
(Donelly, 2007: 24-25). 
Having said that, in order to conceptualize human rights reforms in candidate 
countries, I use the definition of Paul Kubicek (2003a: 113) which is stated as 
"European-style protections from abuses committed by the state." Thus, with this 
conceptualization I will be able to analyze the state policies for accelerating or 
reducing human rights reforms by taking the “European-style protections” as my 
basis. 
On the other hand, for the operationalization I will use the 3
rd 
and the 5
th
 
articles of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) which are torture and 
liberty & security, respectively. I will be focusing on merely these articles because I 
am not interested in finding EU conditionality’s impact on every single human right 
reforms actualized in candidate countries. Due to this reason I will look into the 
changes in the detention periods of the suspects, the conditions in prisons and 
disappearance and killings in custody. I may further operationalize the conditions in 
prisons as the bad treatment of the guardians and the bad quality of living standards, 
i.e. supplying bad food and living with too many people in small places. 
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2.3 Theoretical Framework 
 
2.3.1 Variables and Hypothesis 
My hypothesis is that EU conditionality has a huge positive impact on 
candidate countries’ actualization of human rights reforms. Especially for certain 
candidate countries such as Turkey, one of the most problematic candidate countries 
of the EU in terms of complying with the required reforms, the political 
conditionality serves as an accelerator in realizing the required human rights reforms 
by implementing reform packages. I argue that any country is not able to comply 
with the required human rights reforms in a short time period if there is no EU 
conditionality laid down as a prerequisite for realizing the full membership to the 
Union. Therefore, the transforming power of EU conditionality on a candidate 
country’s domestic and international policies seems to be very significant (Kohen, 
1999, Akyol, 1999, Cemal, 1999). In short, my argument is that, although there are 
some rival hypotheses stated in the literature, such as military presence’s impact, 
government formations’ role and economic growth’s impact as determinants for 
defining one countries’ ability and capability to actualize human rights reforms, EU 
conditionality deserves a greater attention for being a determinant in reform 
processes. I do not deny the impact of these variables on human rights reforms’ 
actualization; however, I argue that their impact is minor compared to EU 
conditionality’s impact. My crucial case will explain this issue more specifically. 
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 2.3.1.1 Main Variables 
I am planning to analyze the European Commission progress reports on 
Turkey between 1998 and 2012 in order to observe if there are any human rights 
reforms actualized on association with EU conditionality.  I may also investigate the 
European Convention on Human Rights in order to better operationalize my 
dependent variable. For example, because I am interested in detention periods of the 
suspects, the conditions in prison, disappearance and killings under custody, etc. I am 
planning to operationalize human rights reforms under 3
rd
and 5
th
 articles of the 
European Convention on Human Rights which are torture and liberty & security, 
respectively. On the other hand, for my independent variable, EU conditionality, I 
will look into the Copenhagen Criteria in which the conditions were declared. I also 
plan to analyze the acquis communautaire in order to measure political 
conditionality’s impact before 1993 Copenhagen Criteria. Therefore, by analyzing 
the European Convention on Human Rights, European Commission’s Progress 
Reports, Accession Partnership documents on Turkey, harmonization packages of the 
EU on Turkey, the amendments that occurred in Turkish constitution due to these 
harmonization packages I am planning to collect valuable data for my hypothesis. 
 
2.3.1.2 Control Variables 
There are certain intervening variables that may have an effect on the causal 
relationship between my independent and dependent variables that I will need to 
control for. For example, some intervening variables such as domestic awareness and 
willingness to change in the candidate countries (Schimmelfennig, 2002), political 
readiness of the current member states for enlargement (Grabbe, 2002), the 
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relationship between candidate and member states and the regime type of the 
candidate country (Vachudova, 2001) might affect the causal relationship between 
EU conditionality and candidate countries’ human rights reform processes. In order 
to find the impact of my independent variable on my dependent variable, I need to 
control for these variables. For instance, I intend to control for regime type by 
holding it constant which means that I need to take two countries whose political 
regimes are the same. Although I intend to analyze only the Turkish case, whenever I 
need to compare its membership process with another candidate or a recent member 
state, the political regime should be hold constant in order to investigate  the impact 
of EU political conditionality on human rights reforms actualization processes 
properly. Therefore, I may argue that regime type is not a valid variable to explain 
my dependent variable which gives me the chance for arguing that my independent 
variable has greater importance in determining human rights reforms actualization. 
However, there may be other causes that I need to control for such as domestic and 
political readiness of candidate countries. For this variable I may claim that even if 
the Central and Eastern European Countries were not domestically ready for the 
enlargement immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, with the help of EU 
conditionality they managed to actualize required human rights reforms in such a 
short period of time, from the 1997 Luxembourg Summit to the 2007 Bulgarian and 
Romanian accessions (Grabbe, 2006). 
On the other hand, although it is not an antecedent or intervening variable but 
a characteristic of my independent variable, I argue that the definition of EU 
conditionality should be precisely stated. The clear definition of EU conditionality 
plays a crucial role in determining the impact of EU conditionality on candidate 
countries human rights reforms actualization because if the definition is not clear-cut 
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then a specific application might not be realizable for each case (Grabbe. 2002). This 
situation might cause some inconvenience among the candidate countries and might 
encourage the current member states to define EU conditionality according to their 
own perception/interest which might increase the corruption and decrease the 
potential positive impact of EU conditionality. 
 
2.3.2 The Crucial Case 
If one thinks about the Central and Eastern European Countries’ enlargement 
case, my hypothesis would be valid and the case would be inconsistent with 
especially one of the rival hypothesis, economic growth’s significance. Although EU 
conditionality was there before 1993, with the Copenhagen Criteria it had gain more 
legality in application. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the countries of the 
former Soviet bloc, in general, had bad economies, for example, their total GDP 
represents less than 5% of the current EU GDP (Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003: 
50). Although their economies were in a bad condition, with the invaluable 
assistance of EU conditionality, applicable after 1997 Luxembourg Summit, many 
democratization reforms, including human rights reforms were actualized in these 
countries in a short time period (Grabbe, 2006: 8).  Moreover, Kopecky and Mudde  
(2000: 526) argue that the impact of economic development was obviously quite 
overrated and the most successful democratic consolidation experiences were in 
Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic, where successive governments struggled with 
increasing inequalities, unemployment and poverty. Therefore, in the light of these 
scholars who state that, although the economic situation of the Central and Eastern 
European countries were bad, the reforms were actualized in a short period of time, I 
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argue that, although economy may positively affect human rights reforms’ 
actualization, it is not able to explain a huge amount of democratization reforms 
occurred in the Central and Eastern European Countries while their economies were 
in a really bad situation. Hence, the only reason possible for this reform process 
seems to be the EU conditionality tool put on these countries. Thus, this case is 
consistent with my hypothesis, while it is inconsistent with one of my rivals, which 
means that my hypothesis worth pursuing. 
 
2.3.3 The Methodology 
I am planning to conduct my research by applying single case study method 
through content and discourse analysis. The reason for not using a comparative case 
study for this research is straightforward. Although, a single case study may not be 
able to sense as the basis for a valuable generalization, the case of this study, the 
Turkish case, is a sui generous one. The long journey that Turkey has been having 
since its first application to the Union, in 1987, needs to be analyzed in two phases: 
one is the transition period (1999-2004), and the other is the afterwards. Due to this 
very reason, the impact of my independent variable on my dependent variable will be 
compared in these periods in order to analyze the situation. Therefore, due to the 
existing comparison chance in this case, another case would not be necessary to be 
included.  
Hence, I am planning to discover the causal mechanism between EU 
conditionality and human rights reforms by analyzing different time zones in the  
Turkish case. The Turkish case is chosen because it is one of the most problematic 
cases for the EU in terms of its human rights reforms records. Moreover, if there is 
26 
 
an impact of EU conditionality on candidate countries’ human rights reforms, as I 
expect to observe, Turkish case would be very appropriate to analyze because of the 
newly applied EU conditionality on the country.  
On the other hand, I am planning to apply content and discourse analysis in 
order to make my research more empirically detailed and increase its reliability by 
finding more support for my argument. In my research, I am planning to use content 
analysis method specifically for collecting scientific data for my research question. I 
will make an analysis of actualized human rights reforms in candidate countries by 
focusing on archival data, i.e. the harmonization packages or the progress reports 
published by the EU Commission. I am going to analyze the progress reports on 
Turkey for the purpose of collecting data about its progress in human rights reforms. 
Then, I am planning to apply discourse analysis method in order to find out the 
motivation behind the actualization of human rights reforms in candidate countries. 
With this step, I intend to interpret the conditions for EU conditionality’s 
effectiveness and come up with some control variables, such as regime type of the 
candidate countries, in the meantime. I am also planning to analyze the acquis 
communautaire and the speeches of EU policy makers on candidate countries’ 
human rights reforms progresses for the purpose of understanding their construction 
of specific terms such as human rights. I am also planning to look at the discourse of 
specific groups of people such as journalists who were/are under custody in order to 
understand whether they are satisfied with the actualized human rights reforms in 
their countries. Therefore, applying a single case study method through content and 
discourse analysis would make my research more reliable, promising and fruitful at 
the same time. 
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2.4 Preliminary Findings 
My preliminary findings is that there is an overlap between the period of 
actualized human rights reform (1999-2004) and the EU conditionality’s 
applicability on Turkey (1999). Between 1997 and 1999 there were almost no 
reforms actualized in Turkish domestic structure most probably due to the 1997 
Luxembourg Summit in which Turkey was not announced as a candidate country. 
However, according to the progress reports of the Commission published on Turkey, 
after the 1999 Helsinki Summit, where Turkey gained the candidate status, 
democratization reforms increased significantly. Hence, the harmonization packages, 
the progress reports and accession partnership packages support my preferred 
explanation of the problématique. Because there is an overlap between the periods of 
reforms and the applicability of EU conditionality on Turkey, I believe this study and 
hypothesis worth pursuing. 
In sum, in this thesis I am planning to test my hypothesis which is “EU 
conditionality has a huge positive impact on candidate countries’ human rights 
reforms” through conducting a single case study method. I believe that my argument 
worth pursing due to two separate reasons. First of all, I have found some supports 
from the literature and invaluable preliminary evidence for the hypothesis. Secondly, 
with my operationalization I am planning to focus on some specific areas of human 
right reforms such as changing detention periods and bad conditions in prisons. 
Because these subjects have not been studied in the literature in great detail, I am 
planning to contribute to the existing literature.  
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2.5 The Relationship between EU Conditionality and Human Rights in 
Candidate Countries 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is the most important 
document of 20
th
 century on human rights, provided the basis for the establishment 
of European Convention on Human Rights. However there are some controversies in 
the European Union’s (EU) human rights policies. On the one hand, the Union stood 
as the ultimate defender of human rights both internally and externally, whereas, on 
the other hand, there is a lack of comprehensive and coherent policy at either level 
which causes doubts about the sincerity and credibility of the Union (Alston et al, 
1999: 6). 
The European system is claimed to be the most developed regional human 
rights structure that exists ( Davies, 1988: 13). The Council of Europe, established in 
1949, is the major component of the European System for the protection of human 
rights and its major aim is to be the defender of the principles of human rights, 
democracy, and the rule of law ( Buergenthal et al, 2002: 113). The Council system 
has two constituent parts, one of which is the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the other of which is the European 
Social Charter for Economic and Social Rights. In 1953 the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was accepted and 
entered into force, thus creating two different bodies for the implementation of 
human rights, one being the European Commission of Human Rights and the other 
one being the European Court of Human Rights (Buergenthal et al, 2002: 113). The 
Convention has evolved into an international system of human rights protection 
where member states participate and some scholars argue that it can be interpreted as 
a European Fundamental Rights Constitution (Walter, 2007). 
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The European system, operated by the European Court of Human Rights by 
taking the Convention as the basis, has the power of changing member states’ 
behaviours in legislative terms. For instance, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Greece 
have modified their detention rules due to the demands of the Court (Çakmak, 2003: 
67). 
The human rights issue of the EU can be approached from two sides. The first 
side consists of the mechanisms established for the protection of the human rights 
within the Union whereas the other side comprises the protection of and respect to 
rules established as a prerequisite for the accession to the EU (Çakmak, 2003: 67). 
Although the importance of the human rights principle was emphasized heavily by 
the EU, the Union unfortunately has long been lacking a fully-fledged human rights 
policy, which causes serious problems. Also the enlargement policy of the Union 
poses new threats to the Union’s commitment towards defending fundamental human 
rights (Alston, 1999: 18). 
Until the Amsterdam Treaty came into force, the Union demanded nothing 
but just being a European state as the requirement for being a member. In other 
words, the treaties establishing the Union hardly mentioned the rules for the 
protection of the human rights (Çakmak, 2003: 67). The Amsterdam Treaty posits 
that “the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law”,  which proves that human 
rights is one of the most important core principles of the EU.
4
 The Amsterdam Treaty 
also provides sanctions on the member states, such as suspension on the membership, 
if they violate human rights in a serious way.
5
 European Court of Justice and 
                                                          
4
 Art. 6 TEU (Treaty on European Union) 
5
 Art. 7 TEU. 
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European Council are also the key players in defense and protection of human rights. 
Nevertheless, in June 1993 the European Council decided on certain political criteria 
for the candidate countries’ accession processes, especially for the candidates in 
Central and Eastern Europe, known as the Copenhagen Criteria. Therefore, with the 
Maastricht Treaty, respect for fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European 
Convention, was emphasized clearly. Also, in Nice Treaty of 2000 the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union was proclaimed, proving the Union’s 
eagerness and devotion to the protection of human rights (Çakmak, 2003: 68). 
With the Copenhagen Criteria, the conditions, one of which is the respect for 
human rights, for becoming a member to the Union were established. In that sense it 
is fair to state that, each member state has the responsibility of being guardian in the 
protection of human rights within their territories. This is not the only responsibility 
of the Union, though. The candidate states to the Union should also comply with 
certain criteria including strict human rights requirements in order to realize their 
membership to the Union.
6
 
In sum, it can be stated that as the Union moves from an economic one 
towards a political one, human rights gained more importance both internally and 
externally. The promotion and protection of human rights were emphasized heavily 
by the Amsterdam Treaty and found their places in international human rights law. 
Also, the judicial review of the European Court of Justice was operative for the 
Union, making its obligation for the respect for human rights more visible (Alston, 
1999: 697). The last but not the least, respecting human rights became a precondition 
for the accession to the Union with the Copenhagen Criteria. 
                                                          
6
 Art. 49 TEU. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
EU CONDITIONALITY’S IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
REFORM IN TURKEY 
 Between 1999 and 2004 
 
 
 
3.1 EU Conditionality’s Application and Its Impact on Human Rights Reforms 
 
EU political conditionality can be effective through many ways. One is 
monitoring through the regular progress reports on candidate countries. In addition to 
the legislation mentioned in the European Human Rights Convention, in the reports, 
certain fields are examined and analyzed in order to prepare the candidate country for  
full membership to the Union. In the regular progress reports, the Commission 
analyzes different types of  human rights issues, such as the improvements in the 
fields of civil and political rights, freedom of expression, detention conditions, ill-
treatment and torture in prisons, freedom of association and assembly, the death 
penalty, minority rights, freedom of religion, the ratification of certain conventions 
and cultural rights (European Commission:2001). The Commission enacts 
procedures for bettering human rights conditions in the candidate country and 
provides methods that can be helpful for problem solving. These recommendations 
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of the Commission are in line with EU human rights conditionality and with 
the reports the candidate is provided with both in terms of the required amendments 
in legislation and the ways to carry out these amendments effectively Therefore, the 
role of progress reports in aligning the candidate with EU standards is invaluable.  
Although these appear negative at first glance, the Progress Reports include 
both negative criticisms and positive critiques. Reports do point out improvements of 
the candidate on any policy issue. The Commission can criticize a candidate in one 
policy area where the candidate has shortcomings and show examples of successful 
candidates to encourage improvement. By this way, the candidate can better grasp 
the empirical possibility of actual reform in that area. 
Another way of observing the impact of EU political conditionality is by 
examining the Accession Partnership documents presented by the Union on Turkey 
in 2001, 2003, 2006 and 2007. These documents aimed to provide Turkey with a 
framework for change according to specific schedules. In other words, the 
improvements should be achieved within definite time frames. These documents are 
the complementary to the Regular Progress Reports of the Commission. The main 
documents showing the required possible amendments in the long term are the 
progress reports, but the accession partnership documents are necessary and effective 
in terms of complementary aid programs.  
While preparing the reports, the EU is helped by non-governmental 
organizations, international organizations and their reports, press records and 
academic resources in order to give the final shape to their reports recommending 
policy changes making in candidate countries. By applying certain rules for limited 
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time periods the Accession Partnership documents help to make EU conditionality 
more effective.  
These documents have helped Turkey in many ways. For instance, the 
Accession Partnership documents made Turkey announce a National Program for the 
Adoption of the acquis and a program for making short and medium-term changes.
7
 
Because these documents aimed at altering candidates’ behaviors in the short and 
medium-terms, the Turkish authorities and EU policy makers met on a regular basis 
to discuss progress and obtain updated information about the issue at hand. In 
addition, EU officials attended certain court cases in Turkey, such as those on Leyla 
Zana and Orhan Pamuk, with the aim of monitoring and recording human rights 
violations and improvements. 
In this regard, the reports should be analyzed starting from the 1998 regular 
report of the Commission. The Commission has stated that Turkey addressed certain 
human rights violations and achieved a certain amount of progress. However, 
Turkey’s human rights record was not problem free. The Commission highlighted 
five problems, which consist of persistent human rights violations, major 
shortcomings in the treatment of minorities, lack of civilian control of the army, the 
situation in the South East of Turkey, and disputes with various neighbouring 
countries (European Commission:1998: 21). Nevertheless, the candidacy status 
obtained in the 1999 Helsinki Summit opened the path to accession negotiations 
which in turn triggered Turkey for the purposes of complying with the acquis. This 
significant point and the following reports published by the Commission will be 
                                                          
7
 Further information is available at: Europa Summaries of EU Legislation,  Partnership for the 
Accession of Turkey. 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/ongoing_enlargement/community_acquis_turkey/
e40111_en.htm 
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analyzed in the following section for the purpose of investigating the EU's impact on 
Turkey’s human rights reform.  
 
3.2 Human Rights Records in Turkey: Background Discussion 
 
The human rights lobby tries to provide various ways in which international 
society could influence the human rights situation in different states. The 
international influence on human rights is expected to be strong in Turkey’s 
membership process to the EU (Sugden, 2004: 241). However, due to the 
inconsistent attitudes of the EU, the reform process in Turkey on human rights could 
not be accelerated and for many years the EU could not be considered as a catalyst 
for reform actualization. After 1987, when the application for EU membership was 
submitted by the president of the period, Turgut Özal, until 1995, the EU was not 
capable of having any significant influence in decreasing human rights violations in 
Turkey and some even claim that the violations were increased (Sugden, 2004: 241). 
When the reasons for EU’s incapacity to be a catalyst for reform are considered, it is 
obvious that there is a link between this incapacity and the lack of trust and 
confidence on both sides. On the one hand, the EU remained skeptical about 
Turkey’s capability to be a member of the Union, and on the other, the statecraft and 
the other actors who are responsible for realizing human rights reforms in Turkey did 
not find the promises and leverages sufficient incentive to pursue on reform making. 
In other words, for both the EU and Turkey the situation was not particularly 
appealing.  
Some of Turkey’s characteristic features, such as its big size, being a 
predominantly Muslim country, being a NATO member, and sharing border with 
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unstable neighbours, who could create complexity while fighting against Islam, made 
Turkey a strategic partner for the EU. Due to this strategic position, human rights 
violations were not emphasized when the application was made and the Union turned 
a blind eye to this issue. Also, from the Turkish point of view the European 
understanding on government and public relations were quite dubious. Because the 
security forces in Turkey are under civilian control and the government should be 
accountable to public, Turkey did not feel comfortable with the rules of the game as 
decided by the Union (Sugden, 2004: 242). 
During the 1990s human rights violations were at their peak in Turkey, which 
was negotiating a customs union with the EU. Other than killing “Kurdish patriots” 
in the name of fighting against the PKK
8
, torture and deaths in custody reached their 
peaks in 1994 (Sugden, 2004: 244). In addition to punishing journalists and politician 
some prosecutors were actually strengthening separatism by confiscating newspapers 
and books on the grounds that they insulted state institutions. Turkish law-and-order 
forces lacked restraints, similar to the Latin American-style of state criminality 
where corruption rules (Sugden, 2004: 244). However, the EU was so deeply 
concerned with the establishment of a customs union that it cared about neither 
corruption nor violation of human rights. 
Because the EU is not a human rights organization, it lacks an official 
mechanism to monitor human rights violations. However, after Amnesty 
International lobbyists decided on lobbying in favor of  human rights with the 
European leaders, the Council of Europe took action.  
                                                          
8
 PKK stance for Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan which means Workers’ Party of Kurdistan. 
36 
 
Nevertheless, the Council of Europe is hardly played the most effective role 
in addressing human rights issues. Its last action on Turkey occurred in 1983, when  
Denmark, France, Norway, the Netherlands and Sweden complained about the 
human rights situation in Turkey. These complaints were obviated both by Turkey’s 
signature on the European Convention against Torture and the recognition of Turkish 
citizen's right to petition to the European Court of Human Rights as individuals.  
However, this individual right was not widely announced and, even after the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture had visited Turkey and found 
significant human rights violations, Turkey did not allow them to publish their 
findings. Therefore, more violations were taking place than appeared to be the case. 
In reality, however, it was politically rational for Turkish politicians and 
government actors not to bend to  European pressure. The European Parliament (EP) 
was the only actor who committed on human rights issues and both Turkey and the 
Commission was aware of the fact that the Parliament was little more than a talking 
shop and the most important institution on human rights issues was the Commission. 
The EP’s resolutions were proved to be ineffective due to its inability to 
communicate with Turkish government and public. Because the Greeks were 
lobbying both on the Kurdish issue and the Cyprus problem, it was logical for 
Turkey to reject the resolutions of the EP on the basis of being  biased and serving 
interests of particular nations, such as Greeks. It can even be stated that the EU is a 
"… selfish, rich Christian club who wanted to exclude Muslim Turks but were too 
politically correct to admit their motives" (Sugden, 2004, 245). 
Although Turkish officials were eager to integrate into Europe, they were not 
willing to accept Europeans’ interference in their domestic issues, especially on 
human right related issues. In support of this idea, in 1995 the Foreign Minister Erdal 
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İnönü stated that "[with] the fashion to scrutinize the level of democracy in each 
country the principle of human rights has taken precedence over another important 
principle that of not interfering in the internal affairs of other states" (Uğur and 
Canefe, 2004: 245). It means that Turkish political actors did not hesitate to blame 
Europeans as interlopers as they did not think this criticism would cost them a heavy 
price. 
Although at first glance this attitude of Turkish officials seems a bit irrational, 
admission to the customs union proved that they were not wrong to doubt Europeans' 
sincerity in terms of their scrutiny of Turkey's  human rights violations. For instance, 
one year before the customs union was signed, some international human rights 
organizations such as Amnesty International provided the EU with many reports 
pointing to human rights abuses and violations in Turkey. Despite this fact, the 
customs union agreement was signed in 1996 without ‘a single brick of reform being 
put in place’ (Sugden, 2004: 245). Although the Commission was seen as quite 
effective in stating its decisions in interim reports, such as the report entitled 
"Concerning the Reform Process: The Human Rights Situation and the Consolidation 
of Democracy in Turkey", in which the Commission stated, "the European Union 
strongly supports constitutional and legal reform in Turkey and the Commission will 
continue to follow developments closely and will keep the Parliament informed" 
(Sugden, 2004: 246), in reality they signed the customs union without realizing any 
reform, which proves the Union’s ineffective leverage on reform.  
However, in the mid 1990s, through Council of Europe mechanisms such as 
the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) and the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Europe tried to apply stricter sanctions on Turkey 
on human rights-related issues. For instance, despite all the denials by Turkish 
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politicians, the CPT reported widespread torture in prisons (CPT, 1992). In addition, 
in 1996, the CPT emphasized torture issues by directing public attention to the 
governments’ failure to provide safeguards for detainees (CPT,1996). Furthermore, 
the ECtHR was pulling out its judgments about the human rights abuses of Turkey in 
mid-1995 and mid-1996. The court analyzed some cases such as the Manisa case
9
 
and the Susurluk incident
10
 and maltreatment by the security forces of people in 
custody and people are being imprisoned for non-violent opinions. For instance, the 
court stated that the Zeki Aksoy case that ended with his killing by an unknown 
assailant was important in showing the ill-treatment by the security forces. Zeki 
Aksoy was tortured in police custody at Mardin police headquarters (Sugden, 2004: 
248). He himself reported that, "he had been blind-folded, stripped naked, strung up 
by his arms, beaten, hosed with cold water and given electric shocks through his 
genitals" (Sugden, 2004, 248). 
Turkish officials could not ignore the statements of the Court as had done 
with the Parliament because the Court’s investigation was independent. Also, 
Turkey’s long-standing Council of Europe membership and active participation in its 
processes forced Turkey to accept these statements made by the ECtHR.  
As a result of these criticism and judgments against Turkey, the first 
substantial reform in many years was realized by the Erbakan government in 1997. 
The government "substantially reduced detention periods, abolished incommunicado 
detention in law for criminal detainees and reduced incommunicado detention to four 
days for State Security Court detainees" (Sugden,2004: 248). In practice, it is 
doubtful as to how effective this reform was due to the ongoing practice of police 
                                                          
9
For Further Information: http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=239839 and 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=240144 
10
 For Further Information: http://oraclesyndicate.twoday.net/stories/3213126/ 
39 
 
and gendarmes; nonetheless, the shortened detention period limited the ability of 
security forces to suppress complaints.
11
 
Although the Turkish side  started to take steps to decrease violations of 
human rights, some scholars claim that these steps have nothing to do with EU 
pressure, or at best, the EU played a minimal role (Sugden, 2004: 249). The 
ineffectiveness of the Union was attributed to its unbalanced attitude towards Turkish 
EU candidacy. 
At the 1997 Luxembourg Summit, the EU stated that Turkish was not an 
eligible candidate due to its human rights violations, including lack of respect for 
minorities. However, this supposedly catalyst, non candidacy, could not trigger 
actualization of the reform process in Turkey. In contrast Turkish officials put 
relations with the EU on ice. Turkish officials declared that due to the attitude  
against Turkey’s candidacy manifest at the 1997 Luxembourg Summit, full 
membership to the EU was no longer a priority for Turkey (Criss, 2008: 580). 
However, at the 1999 Helsinki Summit, Turkey did gain candidacy status to 
the Union. It was significant that the Commission stated that Turkey was taking 
positive steps towards making reform in human rights, even if this was not actually 
the case. The Commission emphasized in its progress reports that positive 
developments in Turkey were occurring in line with Turkey's intention to meet the 
Copenhagen Criteria; however, for instance, the Commission stated in 1999 Regular 
Report on Turkey that there was almost no improvement. This underscored that, even 
though Turkey did not show any progress after the 1997 Luxembourg Summit, the 
Union had granted Turkey candidacy status for the purpose of not losing Turkey.  
                                                          
11
 Before cutting detention periods from 30 days to 4 days, the security forces were using the last 
weeks of the detention for the wounds to heal themselves, for the purpose of  not being get caught. 
Nevertheless by this reform they would not be able to continue with that.  
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Because after the Luxembourg Summit decision, when Turkey expressed that the EU 
is not credible in its attitude toward Turkey, the Union wanted to avoid admitting 
they were discriminating against Turkey. 
Until 1999, the EU was not willing to push the reform process in Turkey and 
Turkey was reluctant to actualize human rights reforms because the membership 
target was too distant to encourage Turkey to engage in reform. Even when 
candidacy status was gained in December 1999, the pace of reform in Turkey did not 
speed up immediately, but because the membership possibility got larger via 
candidacy status, it is fair to say that the Turkish politicians and the EU accelerated 
the process. It is in that period that both sides wanted positive result to come out 
reform making process (Sugden, 2004: 259): 
It reflects a fundamental change in our concept of identity and Turkish citizenship. It 
embraces all our citizens with their cultural diversity and undertakes not only to respect 
but also to promote such diversity. This reform package eliminates the bondage of fear 
and replaces it with a confidence in the enriching value of diversity for national unity. 
In a country that has suffered so much from terrorism… the elimination of the death 
penalty for crimes of terror is the most dramatic measure one can imagine. For those 
who do not face such challenges, this may seem as a simple and straightforward 
measure to align the Turkish legal system with the European norms. But you will all 
agree that in the context of Turkey this has been a major achievement. (Uğur and 
Canefe, 2004: 255-56) 
 
However, although candidacy status paved the way to Turkey’s EU accession 
process, the lack of a roadmap for accession together with the lack of specified roles 
for EU institutions, made Turkish candidacy mostly symbolic (Tocci, 2005: 73-83). 
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3.3 Human Rights Problems in Turkey: At a Glance 
 
At the 1999 Helsinki Summit, in which Turkey gained candidacy status, 
Turkey reached a turning point in its relations with the EU. Turkey became more 
aligned with the operational framework of EU policy and the pace of reform 
accelerated (Ulusoy, 2005: 1-18). The Motherland Party was in the coalition 
government and its liberal policies, together with the successful policies of Kemal 
Derviş, fostered an appropriate environment for democratization. For instance, a 
legislative change occurred in the form of decreasing the number of military judges 
serving in the State Security Courts (SSC). In other words, the government aimed to 
minimize the military's impact on civil issues as the Union required (Güney  and 
Karatekelioğlu, 2005: 445) Moreover, Sema Pişkinsüt, who was then the chairperson 
of the Human Rights Commission in parliament, started to play a more influential 
role in the fight against torture and all other practices violating human rights. Hence, 
with the help of the Commission’s reports, efforts by Sema Pişkinsüt and other 
liberal policies, the public became better informed about human rights practices. The 
EU itself, also donated funds directing to preventing these malpractices; i.e. many 
security officials were trained in certain programs which are in harmony with the EU 
standards (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Avrupa Birliği Bakanlığı, 2007). Furthermore, police 
schools and academies were required to include human rights education in their 
curricula. Other than these developments, F-type prisons, which are high-security 
prisons, were scheduled to be built by the government. The government aimed at 
building four more F-type prisons in order to increase the number to fifteen by 2000 
with the aim of make the number of prisons a lot more sufficient (Council of Europe, 
2000). 
42 
 
The Commission appreciated efforts made by Turkish government, to reform 
political life and the judiciary and to give more importance to the protection of 
human rights, with the aim of harmonizing these key features of the EU (Külahçı, 
2005: 390). Nevertheless, the Commission tried to direct Turkey’s attention to the 
following deficiencies: shortcomings in terms of human rights protection, 
inadequacies in the protection of minorities, torture, freedom of expression, the 
emergency courts system, and the death sentence imposed upon PKK leader 
Abdullah Öcalan (European Commission, 1999). 
The Helsinki Summit triggered the so called ‘Europeanization’ process along 
with some related institutional developments. For instance, in 2000 the General 
Secretariat for the EU Affairs was established and Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit 
announced that  ANAP leader Mesut Yılmaz would be appointed as Minister for 
European Affairs. The ministry and the EU General Secretary’s office were to be 
attached to each other (Hürriyet Daily News, 2000). Moreover, ministries in general 
were making reforms in order to bring their internal structures into line with  the EU 
standards. At that time, harmonization with the EU acquis was one of the main aims 
of various government officials. 
Although government officials aimed to make reforms in order to be eligible 
for the commencement of  negotiations, many human rights violations and problems 
remained.  
Between 1998 and 2000, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) 
published nine reports highlighting conditions in prisons and police stations, 
especially the situation of prisoners and their rights of  communication with their 
relatives (Amnesty International, 2002). However, torture incidents continued due to 
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weak oversight mechanisms, so,  poor conditions did not disappear entirely. 
Although in 1997 the Erbakan government reduced the detention period to four days 
for  State Security Courts detainees actual enforcement was insufficient to achieve 
harmonization with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
In fact, according Human Rights Watch reports, torture remained a 
widespread practice. Detainees indicted for common criminal offenses, such as theft, 
reported torture  and deaths occurred in police custody. Furthermore, many detainess 
under accusation of sexual assaults and reported rape in custody (Human Rights 
Watch, 1999). For example, a HADEP official, Muzaffer Çınar, reported after being 
released from detention an incommunicado interrogation eight days at Siirt police 
headquarters due to the his alleged support for the terrorist organization PKK, that he 
experienced serious violence in custody. He clearly stated that 
He had been beaten, that his testicles been pulled using a noose, that he had been 
suspended by the arms and hosed with cold water under pressure. He stated that police 
officers detained his wife and threatened to rape her. Medical and photographic 
evidence of widespread grazing and bruising corroborate his account. At the time of 
writing, no prosecution had been opened against the alleged torturers (Human Right 
Watch, 1999). 
 
In 2000, Turkish legislation was also not in harmony with the ECHR on 
freedom of expression and applications to hold marches and demonstrations. For 
instance, together with several journalists, Sadi Çarsancaklı, who is a lawyer and  
president of the Istanbul branch of Mazlum- Der
12
, was accused of "incitement" at in 
the Istanbul SSC under Article 312 of Turkish Penal Code, "for organizing and 
participating in a nationwide nonviolent demonstration against the headscarf 
restrictions in October 1998" (Human Rights Watch, 1999). The President of the 
                                                          
12
 Mazlum- Der is an association established in 1991 with the purpose of providing solidarity for the 
oppressed and increasing human rights standards. 
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Constitutional Court, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, emphasized the inappropriateness of the 
judicial processes being unduly influenced by political pressure and called for 
harmonization of the Turkish domestic law restricting the basic freedoms of Turkish 
citizens on political expression, with the European Convention. The president of the 
Appeals Court, Dr. Sami Selçuk, also directed attention towards the legitimacy of the 
constitution, which he rated as almost zero, at the official opening of the judicial 
year, and stated that Turkey should not continue crushing minds and stifling voices 
(Human Rights Watch, 1999). Regarding these maltreatments, along with the 
imprisonment of Oral Çalışlar for twenty months under Article 8 of the Anti-Terror 
Law for conducting interviews with Kurdish political leaders, Prime Minister Bülent 
Ecevit acted to suspend all sentences imposed on journalists for three years. 
However, this would not be applied to those prosecuted for public speeches (Human 
Rights Watch, 1999).  
In addition to these ill-treatments, other restrictions and limitations on basic 
human rights and violations were criticized by the EU.  First of all, broadcasting in  
languages other than Turkish was forbidden. Various legal excuses, such as the 
nation that using minority languages might inflame separatist movements were used 
to prevent broadcasting in foreign languages (Human Rights Watch, 2001). The 
usage of language other than Turkish was limited to daily life and (Ekinci, 2004: 
302). Moreover, women’s rights lacked any legal guarantees. For example, honor 
crimes were widespread and violence against women continued, as enforcement 
mechanisms were insufficient. Therefore, certain amendments to the constitution for 
gender equality were required (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2013). 
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In 2000, Turkey launched a domestic debate regarding its accession to the 
Union and signed a number of international human rights conventions (Külahçı, 
2005: 391). With these developments  the Commission acknowledged Turkey's 
improvement in its human rights records. However, shortcomings were also 
highlighted. The Union criticized Turkey on civil-military relations. Also, torture and 
ill-treatment in prisons continued to be widespread and should immediately be 
tackled. The Commission also stressed free enjoyment of the cultural rights of all 
Turks regardless of their ethnic origins (European Commission, 2000). 
 
3.4 Actual Human Rights Reforms in the 2001-2004 Period 
 
 Starting from 1999, Turkey made huge  progress on democratization and 
human rights-related issues. According to Neil Hicks, with the capture of  PKK 
Leader Abdullah Öcalan, in February 1999, a tremendous decrease in the level of 
violence and human rights abuses occurred in parallel (Hicks, 2001: 78).  This 
significant incident event furthered  legal efforts to prevent human rights abuses 
(Çakmak, 2003: 82). Certain amendments to the constitution  took place. For 
instance, the military judge in the SSCs was removed, according to the amendment in 
Article 143 of the Constitution. Another amendment to  Articles 243 and 245 of the 
Penal Code was passed in order to strengthen sanctions against security forces 
(Çakmak, 2003: 82). 
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3.4.1 Reforms and Remaining Problems in 2001 
 
In 2001, parliament enacted a package of thirty-four measures, including the 
removal of restrictions on broadcasting and publishing in minority languages, 
changing the 1926 civil code, which assumes that men are the heads of the household 
into a code that treats men and women as equal and gives women the chance to gain 
more property in a divorce, and a reduction in the pre-trial detention period to four 
days (Gorvett, 2002, 28). Moreover,  the Parliamentary Human Rights Committee 
was established (Gorvett, 2002: 29). The 2001 Regular Progress Report of the 
Commission stresses that the constitutional amendments adopted by Turkey and its 
signature of the European Convention on corruption are promising steps towards 
betterment of human rights in Turkey (European Commission, 2001). However, 
although these improvements were mentioned in the Union's progress report, the 
shortcomings and failings of Turkey were not neglected. For instance, the 
Commission stated that there are significant problems in the implementation of these 
reforms, indicating that Turkey still fall short of meeting the Copenhagen Criteria. 
Therefore, the Union demanded more adequate and effective implementation of 
legislative reforms. In addition, the report also underscores certain shortcomings in 
various areas relating to human rights.  For example, the right of broadcasting and 
publishing in minority languages, Kurdish in this case, is only applicable if it does 
not pose any harm or threat to national security, which is a very broad concept to that 
is open to competing interpretations. The report also points to a huge gap between 
the legal rules and actual practices of women’s rights, especially in the rural areas of 
Turkey. In those parts of Turkey, women are still regarded as inferior to their 
husbands and traditional family and village structures limit the actual status of 
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women (Gorvett, 2002: 29). Regardless of what the legal code states in cases of 
torture and prison mistreatments, the report points to certain malpractices. The 
Human Rights Association (IHD) has reported that in the first nine months of 2001, 
762 cases of torture and mistreatment in police custody occurred (Gorvett, 2002: 29). 
In addition to the aforementioned shortcomings, independence of the judiciary, 
judicial corruption, and regional disparities, especially in South East, are the most 
emphasized deficiencies of Turkey in terms of its human rights practices ( European 
Commission, 2001). 
 
3.4.2 Reforms and Remaining Problems in 2002 
 
In 2002, with a lull in terrorism after the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, Turkish 
officials were more able and willing to consider reforms. Hence, on 3 August 2002 a 
new package of legislative reforms, consisting of reinforcing legal guarantees of 
freedom of expression, abolition of the death penalty, and elimination of legal 
limitations on learning languages other than Turkish, was adopted by the Turkish 
Parliament (Çakmak, 2003: 83). In October 2002, the Commission emphasized the 
progress that Turkey had made up to that point but still had doubts about the 
adequacy of Turkey's compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria and demanded 
further improvement in human rights conditions. One month after the report was 
released, the Turkish government denounced the state of emergency completely and 
the newly elected Justice and Development Party (AKP) led government prepared 
two legislative packages including  
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 the prevention of torture and ill treatment, reinforcing the freedom of expression, press 
and association, changes to the Political Parties and Elections Act, simplification of 
procedures on non-Muslim community foundations as well as the expansion of the 
scope of retrial arrangements on the basis of judgments rendered by the European Court 
of Human Rights (Çakmak, 2003: 83-84). 
 
Even though the Commission recognized the existing efforts of Turkish 
officials to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria, the regular report of 2002 stressed 
that further improvement in these issues of human rights were required to open  
accession negotiations. Some of the aspects emphasized in the report were as 
follows: penal and prison-related aspects, including high security F-type prisons, the 
length of pre-trial detention, the lack of a press union, the concomitant prosecution of 
writers, journalists, and publishers, and reduced sentences for the crime of honour 
killing. In addition, statues related to associations and religious minorities, the 
ongoing functioning of the SSCs, the weakness of democracy and civil rights, 
including fundamental human rights freedoms in law and practice, attracted the 
Commission’s attention (European Commission, 2002). 
 
3.4.3 Reforms and Remaining Problems in 2003 
 
From 2002 until 2004, the Turkish government adopted eights reform 
packages, which changed 218 articles of 53 different laws in order to align with the 
EU’s Copenhagen Criteria:  
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          1st Reform Package- 19th of February 2002 
2nd Reform Package-9th of April 2002 
3rd Reform Package-9th of August 2002 
4th Reform Package-11th of January 2003 
5th Reform Package-4th of February 2003 
6th Reform Package-19th of July 2003 
7th Reform Package-7th of August 2003 
8th Reform Package-14th of July 2004 (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs: 2010) 
 
In 2003, the AKP government’s efforts and willingness to make reform were 
recognized in the Commisson's progress report (European Commission, 2003). The 
AKP government accelerated the reform process and implemented regulations actual 
in this regard. For instance, the Reform Monitoring Group, consisting of the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of State and Chief Negotiator, the Minister of 
Interior and the Minister of Justice, was established  with the aim of ensuring  over 
the sustainability of reforms  in democracy, human rights-related issues, and the rule 
of law (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2010). Nevertheless, the Commission continued to 
emphasize certain problems, such as the problematic efficacy and independence of 
the judiciary, the lack of execution of numerous judgments made by the European 
Court of Human Rights, and the high level of judicial corruption (European 
Commission, 2003). In addition, although the Commission states that torture was no 
longer systematic, ill-treatment in prison and limitations on freedom of speech 
remained. The report also highlighted cases of disproportionate use of violence by 
security forces against non-violent demonstrators even though the number of such 
cases had actually decreased tremendously (Külahçı, 2005: 392). 
50 
 
 
3.4.4 Reforms and Remaining Problems in 2004 
 
In 2004,  the progress that Turkey had made towards complying with 
Copenhagen Criteria was again recognized by the Commission (European 
Commission, 2004). Actually, the year 2004 was a turning point in terms of EU- 
Turkey relations, because that year President of the European Commission Romano 
Prodi visited Turkey for the first time since the signature of the original association 
agreement in 1963 (Hürriyet, 2004). In 2004, scores of constitutional amendments, 
including “new regulations as regards gender equality, freedom of the press, and the 
status of international conventions and the functioning of the judiciary” were realized 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010). While Prodi congratulated Turkey for its rapid 
and successful reform process, he emphasized the problems in implementing these 
reforms (Hürriyet, 2004). For example, he emphasized that although a reform had 
been issued on permitting foreign language usage in broadcasting and education, this 
reform had had little practical effect. Additionally, corruption in the judiciary, penal 
and prison-related shortcomings, such as ill-treatment of  people in custody, 
prosecution of writers and journalists, disproportionate use of violence against 
demonstrators, and abuses of women  were emphasized in the 2004 Progress Report 
of the Commission.  Abolition of death penalty in all circumstances according to 
Protocol No 13 to the European Convention on Human Rights was signed. A new 
Penal and a Civil Code have been adopted including the aim for fighting against 
torture and ill-treatment (European Commission, 2004). For instance, if the tortured 
dies under custody, the officer would concede a lifetime imprisonment. 
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Other than these developments, one of the most important development 
towards the membership has been occurred. That year, Turkey enacted a law in 
human rights that accepted the superiority of the international law over national law. 
According to official sources, considerable amount of cases made reference to the 
ECHR law in 2004 and it help to ease the transition process for better human rights 
records (European Commission, 2004: 30). 
Individuals were able to make complaints about the abuses of the human 
rights that they have been through to the Human Rights Presidency. An easily 
reachable form with set of question inspired by the ECHR was waiting for them to 
complete and put in complaint boxes. With this new application it is aimed that 
human rights abuses would be told wide spread which seems an efficient way to 
decrease the amount (European Commission, 2004: 32). However, it took time for 
the people to get courage for making their voices public because they feel insecure 
about it.  
In addition to the human rights protecting bodies that was established since 
1999, such as Reform Monitoring Group and Human Rights Presidency, a human 
rights Investigation Office was established by the Ministry of Interior with the aim of 
inspecting police stations (European Commission, 2004: 32).  Turkish authorities 
supported and initiated a number of training programs on human rights for the 
security forces and relevant personnel such as lawyers and judges. The training were 
made by 225 professional trainers and the trainees' numbers were more than 9.000 
(European Commission, 2004: 33). 
The last but not the least, the successful wave of legislative and 
administrative reforms regarding combating torture and ill-treatment continued. 
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Government's decisiveness about zero tolerance policy about torture helped to ease 
the process. In this regard, there was no chance for those who practices torture and 
ill-treatment to convert their sentences into fine. Also, the need for taking permission 
from the superior for opening investigations against officials was cancelled 
(European Commission, 2004: 33).  Although, not being fully sufficient, these efforts 
showed eagerness of Turkish government to improve its human rights standards. For 
instance, the zero tolerance for torture and the decisiveness of the government to 
pursue the legislative reforms decreased the number of the complaints related to 
torture. In 2004, instances of torture were 29% less than the previous year (European 
Commission, 2004: 34).  However, despite these positive outcomes, it has been an 
essential need to establish an independent monitoring system  of detention facilities 
in order to eliminate the remaining problems about these types of human rights 
abuses.  
 Because Turkey was found very successful by the Commission in making a 
bunch of legislative and constitutional reforms, the monitoring procedure on Turkey, 
that had been applied since 1996, was lifted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe (European Commission, 2004: 30). 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 EU CONDITIONALITY’S IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
REFORM IN TURKEY 
From 2005 onwards 
 
4.1 Actual Human Rights Reforms in the 2005-2012 Period and Possible 
Reasons for the Remaining Problems 
 The pace of the reform realization starting from 1999 until 2004 could not 
actually be preserved after the accession negotiations had started. When EU 
conditionality lost its effectiveness on Turkey, naturally the pace of the reform 
actualization process has slowed down and the implementation has been quite 
insufficient. Although some internal factors such as the impact of the military power 
on politics, different perspectives of the political parties in power and security 
problems were not negligible in slowing down the pace, the major reason behind the 
problems related to reform actualization was mainly related to EU conditionality's 
ineffectiveness. However, there were still some problems in the implementation of 
actualized reforms, the impact of EU conditionality was valid in the transition period, 
and  most of the reforms have been actualized. 
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4.1.1 The Situation After the Transition Period 
 
4.1.1.1 Reforms and Remaining Problems in 2005 
 
 In 2005, The Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture 
(OPCAT) was signed and the ratification of the Protocol No 13 to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that abolishes death penalty in all 
circumstances was enabled. The institutions established to fight human rights abuses, 
such as the Parliamentary Human Rights Investigation Committee, the Human Rights 
Presidency and the Reform Monitoring Group, continued to make enormous 
contributions to the betterment of Turkey's human rights records. However, due to 
the heavy work load, consolidation and the strengthening of these institutions gained 
utmost importance (European Commission, 2005: 20). The Ministry of Interior's 
Investigation Office, a newly established institution against human rights abuses, 
received a large number of complaints from the public via easily accessible forms 
designed based on the ECHR. The Office has also investigated detention procedures 
(European Commission, 2005: 21).   
 Although incidents of torture and ill-treatment have remained unacceptably 
high by European standards,  international and Turkish NGOs and experts have cited 
a remarkable decrease in the number of these abuses. In fact, the President of the 
Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) stated that, " It 
would be difficult to find a Council of Europe Member State with a more advanced 
set of provisions in this area" (European Commission, 2005: 22). New legislative 
reforms, a new Penal Code and new Code of Criminal Procedure also enhanced the 
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ability to combat torture and ill- treatment. For instance, the new Penal Code enabled 
an increase in the terms for imprisonment of whomever practices torture and ill-
treatment. However, although the frequency of these incidents has decreased and 
overall there has been an essential improvement in this situation, there remain 
considerable frequent instances of ill-treatment outside of detention centers. During 
transportation and demonstrations, for example, the rate of torture and ill-treatment 
has not changed measurably (European Commission, 2005: 23). Human Rights 
Boards tried to monitor the situation in detention centers without pre-warning of the 
visits. Although this was a positive development in the eyes of both international and 
national NGOs, the latter remain somewhat uncertain about the independence of this 
monitoring institution. For this reason , it became necessary to establish a fully 
independent monitoring system, which was recommended both by the UN and the 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture. The ratification of the OPCAT, which 
Turkey signed in 2005, would also provide for regular visits by independent expert 
bodies to inspect detention places (European Commission, 2005: 24). 
 Other than that, when it is compared to the previous year,  there is a slight 
decrease in the number of complaints received by the Human Rights Association, 
which shows that the reforms that have been actualized helped in strengthening the 
fight against torture and ill-treatment (European Commission, 2005: 108). 
 Prison conditions have improved tremendously in recent years. In addition to 
the establishment of the monitoring boards and enforcement judges, the 
implementation of a remarkable number of CPT recommendations led to positive 
developments in the prison system. However, this positive trend, has not been 
universal. There remain problems of overcrowding and lack of resources in some of 
the prisons located in various regions of the country. For instance, during its 
56 
 
investigation, the Parliamentary Human Rights Investigation Committee found  
deficiencies such as insufficient resources in the administration and the structure of 
the Tekirdağ F-type prison.  
 A large number of Monitoring Boards, which were deployed to investigate 
the living, health, education and food support conditions of the prisons, conducted 
research on nearly 500 different prisons and recommended improvements to the 
Turkish government (European Commission, 2005: 24). Turkish officials acted upon 
nearly half of the recommendations by re-distributing available  resources. This 
immediate act points to the Turkish government is committed to the membership 
process. Therefore, it is fair to state that there has been a significant improvement of 
human rights conditions in Turkey, especially in the area of torture and ill-treatment 
and the prison system after the transition period. 
 
4.1.1.2 Reforms and Remaining Problems in 2006 
 Similarly, in 2006, reforms continued and improvements in especially torture 
and ill-treatment incidents have occurred. In legal framework, Turkey made progress 
in the ratification of reforms related to international human rights instruments and 
acted upon European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgments; however, when it 
comes to the institutional framework, more effort is need. The ratification of the 
abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances occurred in February 2006. In 
most cases where ECtHR found Turkey in violation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), Turkish officials immediately implemented the judgments. 
However, due to some problems, such as the lack of independency from the 
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government, budgetary problems and insufficient number of staffers, the Human 
Rights Presidency's efficacy has still been questionable.  
 The reforms that were realized in the recent years on detention procedures 
and detention periods and the arrangements of medical treatments of the people in 
custody, which are regulated according to the recommendations of the CPT, have 
shown that there have been positive developments in fighting against torture and ill-
treatment.  Nevertheless,  although these reforms were undertaken in the last years, 
their implementation remains problematic (European Commission, 2005: 13). 
 The Turkish government has not done enough to provide independent 
monitoring of the prisons with the aim of fighting ill-treatment and torture. OPCAT, 
which aimed at providing this facility  has not been ratified yet. 
 In order to increase the transparency and accountability of the public sector 
activities, the adaptation of the law for the establishment of an Ombudsman
13
 is a 
remarkable development in terms of bettering human rights records (European 
Commission, 2006: 60). 
 When it comes to the prison system, no major reform and improvement has 
occurred. The cells have still been suffering from overcrowding and the prisoners 
continue to lack sufficient medical treatment.  
                                                          
13
 The Ombudsman responds to complaints from EU citizens, businesses and organisations, helping to 
uncover cases of 'maladministration' – where EU institutions, bodies, offices or agencies have broken 
the law, failed to respect the principles of sound administration or violated human rights. Examples 
include: unfairness, discrimination, abuse of power, lack of or refusal to provide information, 
unnecessary delay, incorrect procedures. Further information is available at: http://europa.eu/about-
eu/institutions-bodies/ombudsman/index_en.htm 
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 To sum up, implementation and monitoring mechanisms lack efficacy. The 
Union suggests that the Turkish government take more decisive steps to tackle this 
very problem.  
 
4.1.2 The Situation Worsens 
 
4.1.2.1 Reforms and Remaining Problems in 2007 
 It would not be an exaggeration to state that the period from 1999 until 2005 
was very fruitful regarding reform on human rights; however, after this period, there 
was a noticeable decrease in the pace of change. 2007 was especially problematic in 
the implementation of reforms and improvement of the institutional framework. For 
the reasons stated below, the Union started using a harsher tone towards Turkey and 
the Turkish government started to lose its eagerness to implement reforms. It would 
not be an exaggeration to state that EU conditionality thoroughly lost its 
effectiveness. 
 First of all, there occurred some development such as the ratification of the 
First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), which provides individuals the right to apply to the UN Human Rights 
Committee on human rights abuses. However, the Optional Protocol to the UN 
Convention against Torture (OPCAT), waiting since 2005 to be ratified, has not yet 
been ratified. Three additional Protocols
14
 to the ECHR have not been ratified also 
                                                          
14
 Protocol 4, 7 and 12. 
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(European Commission, 2007: 11). Hence, the Union's recommendations on 
establishing an independent monitoring system for prisons have not been adopted. 
 The applications made to the European Court of Human Rights about 
Turkey's violations in this area increased in comparison to the previous year. The 
applications to the Human Rights Presidency also increased. Human Rights Boards 
continued to visit detention places in order to monitor the situation. However, both 
the reliability of these institutions have continued to be questioned by some NGOs, 
such as Mazlum-Der, and public awareness of these institutions' functions has not 
been sufficient (European Commission, 2007: 13). 
 Positive developments in terms of reducing the number of cases related to 
torture and ill-treatment continued. In addition, there has been a focus on 
implementing the Istanbul Protocol. 
15
 Nevertheless, the ongoing problem of lack of 
an independent monitoring institution, represents a continuing obstacle and the 
Union emphasizes the importance of the ratification of the OPCAT due to this very 
reason. 
 The actions of security forces have also been a problem. The issue of 
impunity  has not yet been fully resolved and judicial proceedings into allegations of 
torture and ill-treatment by security forces have been delayed due to procedural 
inefficiencies and abuses (European Commission, 2007: 14). 
 The problems the prison system carrying over from the last year, such as 
overcrowding and insufficient resources have persisted. The provision of  
                                                          
15
 Istanbul Protocol is a manual on the effective investigation and documentation of torture and other 
cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment. The manual was submitted to the UN Human 
Rights Commissioner for Human Rights on 9th August 1999. The Protocol briefly provides guidance 
on effective investigation and documentation of torture and ill-treatment incidents. 
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independent oversight of civilian and military prisons still depends on ratification of 
the OPCAT. 
 
4.1.2.2 Reforms and Remaining Problems in 2008 
 The ongoing problems in human rights applications continued into 2008. No 
human rights instruments were ratified. Both the OPCAT and the other three 
additional Protocols to the ECHR have been awaiting ratification since 2005. This 
situation shows that, although the Union emphasizes the importance of the 
ratification of these protocols for Turkey's membership, Turkish officials have been 
much less interested in complying with this demand. 
 In order to investigate torture and ill-treatment in prisons and detention 
centers, two sub-committees under the Human Rights Investigation Committee were 
established. Moreover, a comprehensive set of safeguards, including medical 
examination of detainees under police custody, has established with the aim of 
fighting torture and ill-treatment (European Commission, 2008: 13). 
 On the other hand, the conditions in prisons improved noticeably. In order to 
tackle  overcrowding problem, twelve new prisons have been established, with an 
additional twenty-two prisons on the way (European Commission, 2008: 14).  Prison 
personnel have been trained according to the Union's judicial modernization and 
Penal reforms  program. 
 Unfortunately, despite this progress, the overall picture remains less 
promising. There has been an increase in the number of the applications related to 
cases of torture and ill-treatment received by NGOs. It is detected that the security 
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forces could not prevent  torture and ill-treatment during arrests or transfers between 
prisons. 
 These shortcomings show that these limited efforts to better human rights 
record were insufficient and immediate corrective action is needed in this area. The 
ratification of the OPCAT, which aims at establishing monitoring of the prisons and 
combating torture and ill-treatment, should no longer be delayed and ratification of 
human rights instruments should occur. 
 
4.1.2.3 Reforms and Remaining Problems in 2009 
 In 2009, although ratification of some human rights instruments, such as the 
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, was achieved, the 
ratification of the OPCAT and three optional Protocol to the ECHR remained to be 
accomplished. The OPCAT finally reached Parliament for approval but there did not 
ECHR Protocols.  
 The increase in applications to the ECtHR against Turkey also points to a 
problem in fighting human rights abuses. Abuses related to the right to a fair trial, 
freedom of expression and the prohibition of torture increased when compared to the 
previous years. This fact is a clear sign of how the pace of the reform decreased. 
 Although the training of the security forces, judges, public officials and 
prosecutors continued, there has still occurred an increase in the number of 
applications to the Human Rights Presidency and Human Rights Boards, which are 
responsible for visiting detention centers and investigating human rights violations 
(European Commission, 2009: 14).  These institutions have been weakened by the 
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lack of independency, public awareness and resources. Due to that reason, although 
the increase in applications may show that, when compared to the previous years, 
public awareness of these institutions' functionality has grown stronger, those are 
lacking autonomy and resources, which prevents them from operating efficiently. 
Nevertheless, the parliament has established four sub-committees under the Human 
Rights Investigation Committee, including a sub-committee on torture, ill-treatment 
and prisons (European Commission, 2009: 14). 
 There has also been a progress in combating the problem of official impunity 
for human rights violations. The death in custody of Engin Çeber in 2008 was a 
notable case with sixty officials found responsible for this incident. After their 
indictment, the trial started in 2009 and resulted in the 2012 sentencing of three 
official-Selahattin Apaydın, Sami Ergazi, Fuat Karaosmanoğlu-with life-
imprisonment terms due to the severity of the torture they applied (Radikal Türkiye, 
2012). It is also obvious from this fact that, although the Turkish government 
established a comprehensive set of safeguards to fight torture and ill-treatment, the 
implementation of these safeguards remains incomplete, and the publications of the 
report by the Council of Europe's Committee for Prevention of Torture (CPT) should 
be helpful in accelerating  progress in this area (European Commission, 2009: 16). 
 The prison reform that started in the recent years continued to progress. As 
previous years, new prisons have been constructed in order to solve overcrowding 
problems and a number of small outdated facilities were closed in order to improve 
the existing conditions. The establishment of a fifth center, adds to the existing four, 
that already provide pre-service and in-service training for prison officials. However, 
the high proportion of prisoners who remain in a state of  pre-trial detention remains 
a huge obstacle to solving the overcrowding. In addition to that, inadequate 
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resources, such as the failure to provide the issue standard ratio of one doctor to 250 
prisoners, make it impossible to provide proper medical care for  prisoners. Due to 
that reason, Turkey needs further efforts in its prison reform program (European 
Commission, 2009: 17). 
 Last but not the least, the establishment of an Ombudsman has also been 
delayed by legislative obstacles. The Constitutional Court stated that, "the 
institutions not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution would distort the integrity of 
the administration and parliament had no legislative power to establish such an 
institution" (European Commission, 2009: 71).  The constitutional amendment that 
would establish an Ombudsman should be adopted for the sake of creating an 
authority to fight maladministration in human rights cases. Since there is no 
independent national  institution for monitoring detention places and the OPCAT 
awaits ratification, the establishment of an Ombudsman is an essential step, in the 
eyes of the Union, towards strengthening the fight against torture and ill-treatment. 
 
4.1.2.4 Reforms and Remaining Problems in 2010 
 In 2010,  the ratification of human rights instruments such as the OPCAT and 
the three optional Protocols to the ECHR were still pending, which is not a very good 
sign of Turkey's eagerness for the implementation of the required reforms. Also, the 
number of cases where the ECtHR found Turkey to have violated the ECHR 
increased. With the aim of decreasing this number, Turkish officials made the 
necessary statutory amendments enabling individual applications to the 
Constitutional Court. However, a bunch of ECtHR rulings on issues related to 
oversight of the security forces, stronger remedy and redress of abuses and excessive 
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length of pre-trial detention periods , have not been complied with by Turkey for 
some years (European Commission, 2010: 16).   
 Regarding the establishment of human rights institutions, there has been little 
progress. For instance, the draft law on the establishment of the Turkish Independent 
Human Rights Institution was submitted to parliament and the parliamentary sub-
committees were open to discuss the opinions of  NGOs about this institution's 
functions. These discussions with NGOs were crucial in aligning the institution with 
the UN framework that focuses on autonomy and functional efficiency.  
 Other than that, a constitutional amendment to establish an Ombudsman was 
drafted, which is a positive step by Turkey towards fighting human rights abuses. 
However, the partiality, dependency and inefficiency of the human rights institutions 
continued to be key deficiencies. Moreover, although the trainings of the public 
officers and security forces continued,  continuing  lack of resources undermined the 
efficiency of these trainings. Also, the training of prosecutors, judges and health 
personnel to provide for a more effective investigation into torture and ill-treatment 
incidents continued and the implementation of the Istanbul Protocol in order to 
provide  guidance on effective investigation and documentation of torture and ill-
treatment incidents came up (European Commission, 2010: 17).   
 In some, although progress has taken place in several areas, a number of 
reforms have not occurred which proves that there has been serious problems in the 
implementations of the reforms. Disproportionate use of force by security forces has 
continued to be a serious type of human rights abuse. The incidents resulting in death 
increased according to NGO reports. Therefore, a draft law foreseeing the 
Establishment of  a Monitoring Commission on Security forces was submitted to the 
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Parliament with the aim of monitoring the disciplinary procedures against public 
officers (European Commission, 2010: 18). Although, the Turkish government seems 
to be eager in fighting with the abuses that the law enforcement officers committed 
incident in which disproportionate use of force was applied, have not been 
eliminated. 
 Regarding prison reform, that there have been ongoing problems. One of the 
most important one is the overcrowding problem, which gets worse every day due to 
the high proportion of prisoners in pre-trial detention, such that, only 12% of the 
prisons host prison sentences, the rest hosting those awaiting trial (European 
Commission, 2010: 19).   In addition to that problem, health related problems are still 
of concern and despite all the warnings by the Union and the UN, resources remain 
insufficient. 
 
4.1.2.5 Reforms and Remaining Problems in 2011 
 In 2011, as for ratification of human rights instruments, there has been a huge 
step towards establishing an independent monitoring system for prisons via the 
ratification of the OPCAT, which had been waiting to be ratified since 2005. 
Although this has been a huge step towards eliminating torture and ill-treatment 
incidents, the three additional Protocol to the ECHR were still waiting to be ratified. 
Turkish government also did not seem so eager to apply some of the ECtHR 
rulings.
16
 However, finally the draft legislation on the establishment of an 
Ombudsman was submitted to the parliament. 
                                                          
16
 Non-implementation of the Hulki Güneş, Göçmen and Söylemez judgements has resulted in the 
defendants being deprived of liberty for several years without due process of law. A legislative 
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 Although the training of security forces continued, NGOs reported that 
incidents of disproportionate use of force increased. Although the courts were giving 
priority to these cases of ill-treatment at the hands of security forces, lack of an 
impartial and independent police-complaints mechanism undermines the integrity of 
the administrative investigations. There is a rapid need for an independent 
mechanism, where investigations would not be carried out by fellow police officers 
(European Commission, 2011: 22).   In some, although the ratification of the OPCAT 
was a significant step, there has not been much in practice. Due to that reason, 
reports of torture and cases of ill-treatment in prisons increased. Fight against 
impunity should be strengthen. The privileges, such as lighter or suspended sentences 
given to the security forces that practice torture and ill-treatment, should be 
eliminated totally if authorities are serious about fighting human rights abuses.  
 As for prison reform, there has been a positive development on healthcare 
conditions. The rehabilitation centers for convicts and detainees increased in number 
(European Commission, 2011: 23).   However, the lack of resources and 
overcrowding problems posed a threat to the efficiency of the reform. The decision 
procedure for a sentence should be accelerated in order to tackle with the 
overcrowding problem, which would also be helpful in using existing resources more 
efficiently. Therefore, overall, the detention and prison conditions would be bettered.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
amendment is required to remedy this situation. Moreover, Turkey has not adopted legal measures to 
prevent repetitive prosecution and conviction of conscientious objectors. Other issues awaiting 
legislative measures by Turkey concern of the activities of security forces, effective remedies against 
abuse, restrictions on freedom of expression, and excessive length of pre-trial detention. 
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4.1.2.6 Reforms and Remaining Problems in 2012 
 When we came to the year 2012, in the progress report the EU is changed its 
usual tone about the progress that Turkey have made so far. It is easy to recognize 
that the language and its tone sounds more harsh and pessimistic from the side of the 
Union. For instance, as numerous judgments of the ECtHR have been ignored for 
several years, the Union was focusing on this issue. However, this year the call for 
implementation of all ECtHR judgments was much more forceful. 
 The Union acknowledged the amending of the mandate of Human Rights 
Inquiry Committee that enables it to take the lead on certain draft laws. Following 
this amendment, the Committee received approximately 4000 petitions concerning 
allegations of unfair trial and ill-treatment (European Commission, 2012: 19).   
Legislation for the establishment of an Ombudsman has been adopted, but the 
required establishment of independent monitoring institutions proposed by the 
OPCAT has not been realized yet. A National Preventive Mechanism has not been 
established yet. Additionally, although the positive trend of fighting against torture 
and ill-treatment continued, such events  continued to occur. There has been marked 
increase in the use of disproportionate use of force by  security forces. Due to that 
reason, the Union finds Turkey's efforts in fighting against human rights abuses and 
impunity insufficient. It requires more prompt, thorough, impartial, independent, and 
effective investigation on torture and ill-treatment incidents practiced by security 
forces. The short and suspended sentences given to public officers found guilty of 
torture, ill-treatment, and fatal shootings, should immediately be eliminated 
(European Commission, 2012: 20).   
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 Other than that, there have been ongoing shortcomings in the prison reform 
system also. The problems of overcrowding and lack of resources continued and the 
insufficient monitoring standards could not be  brought in line with the UN 
standards, which hampers the effectiveness of prison reform. 
 In some, the Union found the efforts of Turkish government very limited and 
insufficient so far. Although there have been similar problems in the previous years, 
in 2012 the tone of the criticism got harsher with expressing the Union some 
pessimism on Turkey's ability to gain full membership. 
 
4.2 Possible Causes for the Remaining Problems : "Should Be"s and "Should 
Not Be"s in Making EU Conditionality Effective 
 As the facts above show, the relationship of Turkey with the Union got worse 
over time and the implementation of the required reforms slowed down. For instance, 
although the Union mentioned the importance of the ratification of the OPCAT in 
every single progress report since 2005, this did not occur until 2011. Moreover,  
incidents of torture and ill-treatment never ceased although there has been a positive 
trend progressively. In sum, it can be stated that although in earlier years, the 
eagerness of Turkish government to implement the required reforms was observable, 
towards later years both the Union and the Turkish government seem to give up 
doing what they have been doing. In that regard, it is fair to state that the main reason 
behind this downward trend is that EU conditionality lost its effectiveness. In 
motivating Turkish officials on making and implementing reforms. This section, 
focuses on factors that may play a role in strengthening EU conditionality's 
effectiveness. 
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4.2.1 Need for Consistency, Credibility and Existence of a Real Reward 
 An asymmetrical relationship exists when it comes to EU influence over  the 
candidate states. First, the Union can dictate non-negotiable requirements and 
withhold the reward of accession for the candidate's non-compliance with EU 
requirements. However, " one should note that the prospect of receiving the reward 
must be real, that is, there must be certainty that political change would be rewarded" 
(Kubicek, 2003a: 17) 
 Thus for the sake of preserving its credibility, the EU should apply a 
consistent form of conditionality. However, conditions were stricter and tougher for 
Turkey and the latest member states proved that there is no consistency in the 
applicable conditions (Smith, 2004: 113-15). In addition, some argue that the EU 
lacks credibility, because some of the requirements it imposes on its candidate states 
are not sufficiently applied in its own member states. In other words, some of the 
same conditions were never demanded by some of the member states. For instance, 
while  in France and Greece the existence of minorities within the borders of the 
aforementioned states was not recognized, the EU emphasizes this issue, with respect 
to Turkey (Tocci, 2005: 79). This example, instill doubt in minds about the Union's 
consistency and credibility. 
 In order to better understand the reasons behind the ineffectiveness of  the 
EU's conditionality approach towards Turkey, five main sub-categories need be 
analyzed (Zalewski, 2004: 22): 
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 a lack of credible material commitment to Turkish accession by the EU; 
 imprecisely defined criteria for evaluation;  
 vulnerability to accusations of double standards;  
 the diffusion of mixed signals;  
  and the threat of politicizing human rights criteria, whether in the context of an 
evaluation, a decision to open accession negotiations, or a decision to admit new 
members. 
 The analysis of these sub- categories and their examples in the Turkish case 
can illuminate the importance of preserving the efficiency of  EU conditionality, if 
the latter aims at making an impact on the reform-making process in Turkey. 
 
4.2.1.1 Lack of Material Commitment to Turkish Accession 
 Zalewski states that, referring to Villavarde (1998), since the beginning of its 
relationship with Turkey, the EU has demands reforms and imposed requirements 
without making an actual material commitment to promoting this process (Zalewski, 
2004: 22). For instance, with the Customs Union Agreement, five financial 
instruments were set up for Turkey, including a special financial measure of €375 
million over five years, in addition to €750 million worth of loans from the European 
Investment Bank (Zalewski, 2004: 22). Nevertheless, the major part of this aid 
package was blocked both by the European Parliament and one of the member states, 
Greece. Considering the amount of aid that the Union made for the Central and 
Eastern European Countries, Turkish officials argue that Brussels discriminates 
against Turkey, suggesting that the pace of reform would decrease in the absence of 
adequate financial assistance (Avcı, 2002: 91-110). 
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4.2.1.2 The Criteria for Evaluation 
  The non-transparency and the vulnerability of the human rights criteria of the 
Union undermined the credibility of the Union's human rights conditionality and 
decreased the willingness of Turkish government to comply with the uncertain 
conditions. One of the most important problems ,according to Zalewski, has been 
that neither the progress reports nor the accession partnership documents include any 
clear benchmarking mechanism for analysis of the actualized human rights reforms 
in Turkey. Therefore, subjective interpretation leaves doubts about human rights 
conditionality's even-handed implementation. As Smith (2004: 29) suggests, an 
effective monitoring system is required and an objective application of a particular 
criteria is essential in triggering the reform process in the candidate states. 
 
4.2.1.3 Perceptions of Double Standard  
 According to Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel (Schimmelfennig et al, 
2003), cited in Zalewski (2004: 29), if there is a fair and equal understanding of the 
conditions imposed on all member and candidate states and there is not much 
variation from one country to another, the criteria's "compliance pull" is said to be 
very strong. However, if the conditions are not applied on the same basis to the 
Union as a whole, conditionality would not be able to exert the same leverage 
(Zalewski, 2004: 29). Since Luxembourg Summit, both Turkish officials and citizens 
have argued that the Union's evaluations of Turkey's eligibility is based on a double 
standard (Zalewski, 2004: 30). Zalewski (2004: 31) further adds that: 
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As it [The Turkish Political Elite] tends to identify the double standards, of which it 
accuses     Brussels, as expressions of ‘Islamophobia’ and exclusionism on the part of 
the Union, a large section of the Turkish political elite have their doubts as to Turkey’s 
prospective EU vocation. Such views, naturally, do not leave the strength of the Union’s 
human rights conditionality untouched: the shared suspicion that the Union would like 
to exclude Turkey from membership on ‘civilisational’ grounds casts serious doubt on 
the credibility of the EU’s conditionality policies and, in consequence, reduces Ankara’s 
incentives to comply with EU human rights criteria. 
 
4.2.1.4 Contradictory Signals 
  According to Zalewski, this reason is one of the strongest one in explaining 
why  EU conditionality lost its influence on Turkey's human rights reform-making  
process. While the CEECs were assured of prospective membership in the EU, from 
1993 onwards, Turkish officials could not feel the same assurance that it would gain 
membership even if it satisfied the formal requirements. The Union has been sending 
mixed signals, which reduces others' trust in it. For instance, in European elections, 
the stances of the member states changed dramatically. A government committed to 
Turkish membership, German SPD, can be replaced by a government, CDU/CSU, 
for which Turkey is not an eligible country for Union membership even if it complies 
with all the criteria and does every reform that is required for full membership 
(Zalewski, 2004: 31). In such an uncertain environment, it would not be realistic for 
the conditionality tool to be effective in promoting reform.  First, if the messages 
sent by the Union were made less ambiguous, then the conditionality tool would be 
effective in making Turkish officials eager to actualize reform.  In other words,  
opposing positions towards Turkish membership process ranging from the "no-
oriented stance of the German CDU" to the more "Turkey friendly view" coming 
from Rome, Warsaw and London, make the conditionality tool much less effective in 
Turkish reform making process (Zalewski, 2004: 33). Turkish officials would not be 
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willing to invest massive political and economical assets in making reform if they do 
not see a certain future reward. 
 
4.2.1.5 Politicization of the Human Rights Criteria 
  As Zalewski (2004: 33) sees it, the EU conditionality for human rights for 
membership has a political tone rather than a legal one. Due to that reason, this 
criteria is wide open to subjective interpretations in the name of security, economic 
and political considerations. Some scholars such as Meltem Müftüler Bac and Lauren 
McLaren (2003) argues that, Turkish membership is a process beyond a simple 
analysis of whether it complies with the Criteria or not (Zalewski:2004: 33). In other 
words, due to the its politicization , this Criteria while it is a requirement for the 
membership, it unfortunately is not sufficient for in the Turkish case. In order to 
eliminate this problem, as Nowak (1999) sees it, the Criteria should be legal and 
judicial rather than economic and political (Zalewski, 2004:35). Also, the Union's 
institutional bodies-the Commission, the Council and the Parliament-should establish 
some mechanisms for monitoring the human rights situations in candidate countries 
and the autonomy and impartiality of these institutions should be assumed. If this is 
not realized the relationship of Turkey with the Union would probably become a 
vicious circle, "in which the lack of EU commitment to membership will give rise to 
Turkey’s lack of commitment to reform, which will give rise to negative EU 
evaluations, which will give rise to Turkish resentment… and so on and so forth" 
(Zalewski, 2004: 35). 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Although being so eager to become a member to the Union, Turkey had to go 
to a long way before it would be count as an eligible candidate state for the full 
membership. First in 1959, Shortly after the creation of European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1958, Turkey made its application to be a part of the 
Community. However, the  EEC responded as suggesting an association between the 
two until the circumstances allow Turkey to join. In result of this suggestion, the 
Ankara Agreement of 1963 was signed between Turkey and the EEC, foreseeing a 
customs union that would ease the integration process of Turkey to the EEC and lead 
to the final aim which is full membership (Embassy of the Republic of Turkey, 
Washington DC, 2004). 
 The EEC was stipulating the establishment of a customs union in order to be 
integrated in economically. At the mean time, the Community was offering financial 
assistance and an increase in its import share.
17
 Following this, in 1970 the 
Additional Protocol was implemented ensuring a free movement of goods and 
services and a harmonization of Turkish legislation with that of the Community in 
economical terms (Embassy of the Republic of Turkey, Washington DC, 2004). 
                                                          
17
 The import share of the EEC increase from 29% in 1963 to 42% in 1972. 
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Although the relationship between the EEC and Turkey was about to came to a 
freeze due to the 1980 military coup and dire economic straits, when the civilian 
government restored in 1983 Turkey adopted a liberal economic policy (Criss, 2008: 
577). It was that time, Turkey applied for full membership to the Union in 1987.  
 The application was seen eligible by the Commission, however, it was 
claimed that a more appropriate environment for the membership is required and the 
Customs Union , envisaged to be signed in 1995, should first be focused on. 
However, although the Customs Union became effective between the two parts in 
December 1995, the Union's not giving candidacy status to Turkey put the 
relationship in a dangerous situation. Following this, Turkish officials publicly 
declared that the membership to the Union was no longer a priority. (Criss, 2008: 
580). Due to the harsh reaction of the Turkish public and officials, the Union granted 
Turkey with the candidacy status in 1999 Helsinki Summit despite there was not 
actually much progress during these two years with the aim of becoming more 
eligible for the candidacy (Sugden, 2004: 249). 
 In the lights of abovementioned process, when Turkey was granted with the 
candidacy status, one of the most important enlargement tool of the Union, the 
conditionality, became effective on Turkey. The existence of the potential for EU 
membership possesses both conditions and incentives by which the process of 
democratization and economic transformation are aimed to be constituted. However, 
if the harmonization of the conditions and incentives is inconvenient, the political 
reform process in the candidate states will naturally slow down (Öniş, 2003: 9). 
Moreover, this situation will unfortunately create an environment where the 
opponents of the membership would gain more power and space to act. In that sense, 
it would not be an exaggeration to state that the Customs Union that Turkey had to 
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sign in 1995, could not be successful in creating both conditions and incentives for 
triggering the transformation of Turkey's domestic politics and economy. However, 
accepting Turkey as a candidate in the 1999 Helsinki Summit, the Union created an 
appropriate mixture of conditions and incentives that leads to an efficient reforming 
process in the side of Turkey.  
 By adapting the draft European Constitution and taking further steps such as 
ensuring the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the European leaders, yet 
again, declared that "the EU is based on the principles of human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. They further 
agreed that in such a Europe, the values of pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, 
justice, solidarity,and equality would prevail" (Doğan, 2006: 256). 
 This study, I believe, successfully demonstrates that the Turkish government 
has taken essential steps in order to adapt its domestic politics to the Union's, whose 
emphasis was the importance of respect for abovementioned values. Turkey did 
achieve to actualize a great amount of reform in the transformation years. In order to 
explain further, the new laws and constant amendments to problematic laws that the 
Turkish Parliament has made, such as the Turkish Penal Code and the Civil Code are 
very strong examples of Turkish officials willingness for change and adaptation. In 
addition to that, the amendments that was made to the Turkish Constitution in 
1999,2001, and 2004 are also good examples to show Turkish government's efforts 
for having a more liberated constitution that is more respectful towards human rights 
(Doğan, 2006: 256). Moreover, the Accession Partnership (AP) of 2000 accelerated 
the changes by pointing out the short term and long term priorities in order to comply 
with the Copenhagen Criteria (Öniş, 2003: 12). When focused on the political arenas 
of the Criteria, a special emphasize on betterment of human rights records is not 
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negligible. The last but not the least, the zero tolerance policy towards torture and ill-
treatment which was adopted and publicly declared by Turkey in 2007 (Delegation 
of Turkey, 2007), is a very important proof showing the eagerness of the Turkish 
government to provide better human rights standards.  
 This thesis mainly asks three previously stated questions. These questions 
will be evaluated and answered below one by one. 
 
Does EU conditionality played a role in Turkey's human rights reform making 
process, and if yes how? 
 
 First of all, EU political conditionality's potential effectiveness in triggering 
Turkish reform making process in human rights was analyzed in thesis through 
certain tools such as regular progress reports and accession partnership documents. 
The findings of this study are straightforward. Although there has been many 
violations of human rights , especially on torture and ill-treatment cases and bad 
conditions of the prisons, the progress that Turkey made following acquiring 
candidacy status is clearly observable. Especially in the first years, the efforts of 
Sema Pişkinsüt, the chairperson of the Human Rights Commission in parliament, in 
fighting against torture and all other degrading practices were very much in line with 
the Union's. Furthermore, the training programs that the security officials had to take 
in order to decrease the ill-treatment incidents were also very essential steps towards 
establishing better human rights standards. In other words, the statements, that 
Human Rights Watch made, declaring that torture and ill-treatment was widespread 
in Turkey, left their places to publishing reports on institutional improvements such 
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as the establishment of Parliamentary Human Rights Committee, new legislative 
packages preventing torture and ill-treatment, and constitutional amendments of 
2005 (Gorvett, 2002: 28) Therefore, it is clear that the EU conditionality tool was 
genuinely effective in boosting the reform making process of Turkey regarding 
human rights violations.  
 One may always argue that, the conditionality tool was not the sole actor in 
this process. This argument may be valid, however, the crucial case that is included 
in the theoretical chapter is a very strong proof for opposing to that argument. If I 
have to re-emphasize, although in the literature there are some rival hypothesis such 
as the importance of the power of economic growth in triggering reform making 
process, the Central and Eastern European Countries' enlargement case is a very 
good example to prove the opposite. As many scholars such as Moravcsik and 
Vachudova stated, in the post-Soviet era, these countries had really bad economies, 
however, they managed to realize a huge amount of reform with the undeniable 
assistance of EU conditionality (Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003: 50). Moreover, as 
Kopecky and Mudde (2000: 526) argue countries such as Czech Republic and Poland 
were the ones to apply democratic consolidation most successfully in spite of the fact 
that they were struggling with high levels of poverty and unemployment. Hence, the 
role of EU conditionality in triggering the whole reform making process is quite 
obvious as it can be derived from these cases. Connecting these with the Turkish 
case, the existence of the role of EU conditionality is proven also in the Turkish case. 
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Does the efficacy of EU conditionality has changed from time to time? 
 
  It is obvious from the third and fourth chapters that in the Turkish case the 
EU conditionality has not had the same efficacy all the time. Although it was 
genuinely effective in the transformation period, following the opening of accession 
negotiations, the pace of the reform making process slowed down.  
 As many scholars suggests, in order to make the EU conditionality effective, 
both the conditions and the incentives should be crystal clear (Kubicek, 2003, Öniş, 
2003, Tocci, 2005, Zalewski, 2004). The candidate country should feel certain of the 
existence of a carrot that it will get after complying with the necessary conditions, 
i.e. the stick. In the absence of any of the these two, it is natural to have some 
obstacles in the process for the both sides. This study argues that the effectiveness of 
EU conditionality was valid for the transformation years because the carrot, that is 
the start of the accession negotiations envisaged in 2005, was there as well as the 
stick, compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria. The consistent attitude of the 
Commission, which gives a guarantee for not having a delay if the Criteria is 
complied with,  is one of the most important aspects in defining the efficiency of the 
conditionality tool. In other words, with the help of  clearly defined carrot, Turkey 
spent lots of effort with the aim of making  necessary reforms in order to provide 
better human rights records. This stick was clearly defined and consistent and Turkey 
was aware of the fact that it might lose its chance to open the accession talks. In that 
arena, effective usage of EU conditionality was perceived. According to the progress 
reports, in those years, the torture and ill-treatment incidents dropped dramatically.  
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 However, after the transition period the situation has changed. The pace of 
the reform making process slowed down and the talks of uncertainty of the process, 
incredibility and inconsistency of the Union's behaviors were widespread in Turkey. 
There occurred  lots of problems in the implementation of the reforms and the Union 
had to repeat itself in its regular progress reports. For instance, the ratification of the 
OPCAT waited for six years to be realized although it was very essential for 
establishing an independent monitoring system for prisons which is of great 
importance in combating against torture and ill-treatment. In sum, it was clear that 
Turkey once was a lot more eager to make reforms than it has been after the 
transformation years.   
 
Why did the pace of the reform making process slow down following the 
transformation period of 1999-2004? What were the reasons behind EU 
conditionality's shifting efficiency? 
 
The findings of this study are straightforward. First of all, it is argued that the 
material commitment by the Union to the Turkish accession has been found 
insufficient. Although financial instrument were set up for Turkey, a great amount of 
the aids were blocked by both the European Parliament and Greece. In this regard, 
Turkish officials felt a discrimination especially when they think about the amount of 
the aid that the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) got in their 
membership process. This situation, naturally, resulted in the distrust of Turkish 
officials to the Union's equality which plays a negative role in EU conditionality's 
impact.  Secondly, the vulnerability of the human rights criteria also decreased the 
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impact of the conditionality tool. In the Turkish case, the Union constantly demanded 
amendments and betterments in the human rights standards but unfortunately due to 
the lack of an efficient monitoring system the application of the criteria was a bit 
shallow. Additionally, similar to the first point, the Turkish government and the 
citizens started to feel a double standard in the membership process which decreased 
the power of human rights conditionality tool. Some arguments such as Turkey's 
ineligibility to become a member due to its Muslim character and some statements 
made by member states such as although Turkey complies with all the criteria and 
realizes every single reform that is required, there is no chance for it to be a 
European Union member state. These double standards and contradictory signals also 
decreased the efficacy of the conditionality tool on Turkish reform making process. 
The last but not the least, human rights criteria itself pose a threat to the effectiveness 
of conditionality in the Turkish case. Similar to the second point, the nature of the 
human rights criteria is a bit problematic to measure. The human rights criteria's 
being political rather than legal and being open to subjective interpretations due to 
the lack of monitoring system makes it hard to evaluate. Therefore, due to 
abovementioned reasons although being quite efficient between 1999-2004, the 
human rights conditionality tool of the EU, unfortunately, lost its effectiveness on the 
Turkish case after the transition period. 
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